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PROXIMATELY ANZA: CORPORATE LOOTING, 
UNFAIR COMPETITION, AND THE NEW LIMITS 
OF CIVIL RICO 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1970, Congress believed organized crime was leeching “$7 to $10 
billion dollars in profits” from society each year.1 The problem was so 
pervasive that, according to one contemporaneous estimate, “[i]f U.S. 
Steel, American Telephone & Telegraph, General Motors, Standard Oil of 
New Jersey, General Electric, Ford Motor Co., IBM, Chrysler, and RCA 
all joined together into one conglomerate merger, they would still be in 
second place.”2 Congress responded to these staggering figures with the 
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), a unique 
combination of civil and criminal provisions.3 The two purposes of the 
civil provision (“civil RICO”) are to compensate victims and to 
supplement criminal enforcement.4 
Subsequent years have seen an expansion of RICO’s role beyond that 
of eradicating organized crime. For many years, plaintiffs have used civil 
RICO’s broad definitions and treble damages provision to combat 
corporate looting and unfair competition.5 Victims of corporate looting 
 
 
 1. Organized Crime Control: Hearing on S. 30 and Related Proposals, Relating to the Control 
of Organized Crime in the United States Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong. 78 (1970) 
[hereinafter Organized Crime Control Hearings] (statement of Rep. William M. McCulloch). 
 2. Id.; see also H.R. REP. NO. 91-1549, at 2 (1970) (citing Congress’s goal as the “eradication 
of organized crime”); 116 CONG. REC. 35,206 (1970) (statement of Rep. Thomas S. Kleppe) (“[T]he 
threat of organized crime cannot be ignored or longer tolerated. It is America’s principal supplier of 
illegal goods and services . . . ; daily it increases its operation in fields of legitimate business, 
employing such illegitimate techniques as bankruptcy frauds, tax evasion, extortion, terrorism, arson 
and monopolization. Its sinister effects upon our Nation must be eradicated.”). 
 3. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968 (2000). For a 
statement of the reasons Congress chose both civil and criminal provisions, see H.R. REP. NO. 91-1549 
at 1, 2 (“It is the purpose of this Act to seek the eradication of organized crime in the United States by 
strengthening the legal tools in the evidence-gathering process, by establishing new penal prohibitions, 
and by providing enhanced sanctions and new remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of those 
engaged in organized crime.”). 
 4. See Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549, 557 (2000) (“The object of civil RICO is thus not merely 
to compensate victims but to turn them into prosecutors, ‘private attorneys general,’ dedicated to 
eliminating racketeering activity.” (quoting Klehr v. A.O. Smith Corp., 521 U.S. 179, 187 (1997))); 
see also Michael Goldsmith & Mark Jay Linderman, Civil RICO Reform: The Gatekeeper Concept, 43 
VAND. L. REV. 735, 741–43 (1990) (critiquing the analysis of Professor Abrams, who believed civil 
RICO’s primary function was criminal enforcement). 
 5. Plaintiffs took nearly a decade to recognize the opportunity presented by civil RICO. See 
AM. BAR ASS’N, REPORT OF THE AD HOC CIVIL RICO TASK FORCE OF THE ABA SECTION OF 
CORPORATION, BANKING, AND BUSINESS LAW 55–58 (1985) [hereinafter ABA REPORT] (“Of 
approximately 270 trial court decisions in the [computerized database of RICO decisions], three 
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find that RICO addresses procedural gaps and substantive inadequacies in 
both bankruptcy and state law that would otherwise withhold protection in 
certain contexts.6 RICO similarly protects victims of unfair competition 
who are unable to invoke antitrust law because they cannot satisfy 
requirements such as standing or “market share.”7 Recently, plaintiffs 
have expanded their use of RICO to combat conversion of corporate 
 
 
percent were decided before 1980, two percent in 1980, seven percent in 1981, 13 percent in 1982, 33 
percent in 1983, and 43 percent in 1984.”). For a discussion of the use of civil RICO in the corporate 
looting and unfair competition contexts, see infra Part II. For an example of civil RICO’s utility in the 
battle against unfair competition, see G. Robert Blakey & Thomas A. Perry, An Analysis of the Myths 
That Bolster Efforts to Rewrite RICO and the Various Proposals for Reform: “Mother of God—Is this 
the End of RICO?,” 43 VAND. L. REV. 851, 908 n.153 (1990). Although civil RICO is available to 
combat corporate looting in the bankruptcy context, courts hesitate to “interfere with the bankruptcy 
court’s orderly marshalling of assets.” Dana Molded Prods., Inc. v. Brodner, 58 B.R. 576, 579 (N.D. 
Ill. 1986). 
 6. Bankruptcy law does not grant insider victims, shareholders, competitors, and unsecured 
creditors any special priority; they are left at the end of the collection line as general unsecured 
creditors. 11 U.S.C. § 507 (2000). This approach neglects to account for the victim status of these 
individuals, instead according them lesser status than secured creditors. For a discussion of state law 
protections, see ABA REPORT, supra note 5, at 63–64, which notes a study by Professor Michael J. 
Herbert and Mr. Dominic E. Pacitti demonstrating the unenviable position of these creditors: 
Of the 4,723 Chapter 7 cases, there were 4,515 in which no assets were distributed, and, as 
noted above, there were 208 cases in which at least some assets were distributed. In 
percentage terms, 95.6% of the Chapter 7 cases were cases in which nothing was distributed. 
Of all the cases closed during the study period, 92.3% were no asset Chapter 7 proceedings 
and 4.25% were Chapter 7 proceedings in which some assets were distributed. 
Michael J. Herbert & Dominic E. Pacitti, Down and Out in Richmond, Virginia: The Distribution of 
Assets in Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Proceedings Closed During 1984–1987, 22 U. RICH. L. REV. 303, 311 
(1988). The ABA REPORT further discusses the inadequacies of state law protections:  
 The most widely shared reason [for retaining civil RICO] was that [c]ivil RICO provides 
incentives for persons injured by habitual securities law violators, racketeers, and others 
engaging in repeated criminal activity to pursue claims that might not be worth litigating 
without treble damages and attorneys’ fees. . . . [Civil RICO also] [a]llows access to federal 
courts, which have better procedures for handling business fraud and similar cases, such as 
liberal joinder rules. 
ABA REPORT, supra note 5, at 63–64. 
 7. Samuel R. Miller and Karl Olsen provide a hypothetical situation in which civil RICO would 
be a better remedy than antitrust law: 
If, for example, a business was injured by fraudulent or predatory practices of a principal 
competitor, and the predator was acting unilaterally and did not have the realistic prospect of 
monopolization, an antitrust claim would be difficult to assert. But if, as is almost invariably 
the case, the scheme was carried out through the mails or interstate telephone calls, the 
plaintiff might well have a RICO treble-damage claim. Even if the predatory defendant did 
have the capacity to monopolize or attempt to monopolize the market, the plaintiff might be 
better off under RICO since no proof of market share and relevant market, and other complex 
antitrust issues, would be necessary. 
Samuel R. Miller & Karl Olson, Recent Developments in Civil RICO, in RICO IN CIVIL LITIGATION 
16–17 (William H. Alsup & Samuel R. Miller eds., 1984). For a critique of the overlap of civil RICO 
and antitrust law, see Virginia G. Maurer, Antitrust and RICO: Standing on the Slippery Slope, 25 GA. 
L. REV. 711, 711–14 (1991); Maurer discusses the interplay between civil RICO and antitrust law and 
recommends changing RICO standing requirements to comport with antitrust standing requirements. 
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assets,8 oppose the hiring of illegal immigrants,9 and halt other unfair 
competition practices.10 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp.11 
threatens to curtail these important uses of civil RICO by implementing a 
narrow application of the concept of proximate cause12—one of the 
several elements a RICO plaintiff must prove as part of its prima facie 
case.13 The plaintiff in Anza, Ideal Steel Corporation, alleged that a 
competitor, National Steel Supply, was able to lower prices because it had 
executed a tax evasion scheme involving mail and wire fraud.14 The Court 
found that the concept of proximate cause limited recovery to only the 
immediate victim of the mail and wire fraud15 and denied recovery to the 
plaintiff, whom the Court believed was a non-immediate, direct victim.16 
This interpretation of RICO’s proximate cause requirement severely limits 
 
 
 8. See Bivens Gardens Office Bldg., Inc. v. Barnett Banks of Fla., Inc., 140 F.3d 898, 908 (11th 
Cir. 1998) (“[A] pattern of racketeering could be directed specifically at a corporation’s creditors. A 
creditor will have RICO standing only when his injury passes the directness test . . . .”); see also GICC 
Capital Corp. v. Tech. Fin. Group, Inc., 30 F.3d 289, 293 (2d Cir. 1994) (“When a corporation 
fraudulently is caused to issue debt and stripped of its assets in a manner that obviously will leave the 
creditors unpaid, those creditors have standing.”). 
 9. See, e.g., Williams v. Mohawk Indus., Inc., 465 F.3d 1277, 1285 (11th Cir. 2006) (holding 
that current hourly employees had proper standing under civil RICO to bring suit against employer for 
allegedly hiring illegal immigrants, thereby depressing the employees’ wages); Baker v. IBP, Inc., 357 
F.3d 685 (7th Cir. 2004); see also Thomas C. Green & Ileana M. Ciobanu, Deputizing—and Then 
Prosecuting—America’s Businesses in the Fight Against Illegal Immigration, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 
1203 (2006) (discussing the role private enforcement plays in immigration law). The authors discuss 
the introduction of immigration violations into the definition of “racketeering” under the RICO statute 
in 1996. Id. at 1220–22. This recategorization of immigration, as a violation of RICO, serves to inhibit 
employers from hiring illegal immigrants. Id. The authors suggest, in light of Williams v. Mohawk 
Industries, Inc., 465 F.3d 1277 (11th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1381 (2007), and Zavala v. 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 393 F. Supp. 2d 295 (D. N.J. 2005), that employers should demand independent 
contractors hire only legal employees and increase supervision of their own hiring practices to avoid 
prosecution under civil RICO. Id. at 1221–23. For new developments in civil RICO’s use in immigrant 
law, see Julie Lam, Note, Show Me the Green: Civil RICO Actions Against Employers Who Knowingly 
Hire Undocumented Workers, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 717 (2006). 
 10. See, e.g., Commercial Cleaning Servs., L.L.C. v. Colin Serv. Sys., Inc., 271 F.3d 374, 378–
80 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268 (1992)). 
 11. 126 S. Ct. 1991 (2006). 
 12. Id. at 1995–98. 
 13. See infra notes 46–51 and accompanying text. 
 14. Id. at 1994–95. 
 15. For purposes of this Note, the term “immediate victim” refers to the party against whom the 
predicate acts are committed. “Non-immediate victim” refers to the party who suffered direct injury 
due to the racketeering, but who was not the primary party upon whom the defendant inflicted the 
racketeering. A “direct” victim is one whose injury is caused by the racketeer’s actions and is not 
contingent on anyone else’s injury. An “indirect” victim is a party whose injury is wholly derivative of 
the injury of another. See infra Parts II.C.2, II.D, II.E. For example, if D mails a letter to A that injures 
both A and B, A is the immediate victim and B is the non-immediate victim. Both A and B are direct 
victims. If the injury causes A to default on a loan to C, then C is an indirect victim. 
 16. Anza, 126 S. Ct. at 1997–98. 
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plaintiff recovery in both corporate looting and unfair competition 
contexts because damages are difficult to prove and the victims are often 
non-immediate. Furthermore, this interpretation frustrates the dual 
purposes of civil RICO by denying compensation to these non-immediate, 
targeted victims of racketeering and consequently reducing the number of 
“private attorneys general” available to supplement criminal enforcement.  
Anza is the culmination of a trend in which courts have struggled to 
balance their unease with RICO’s broad scope against Congress’s mandate 
that RICO be “liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes.”17 
Anza went beyond earlier courts by implementing a strict proximate cause 
analysis that unreasonably limits civil RICO’s availability to plaintiffs and 
creates an almost insurmountable hurdle for victims.18 Under Anza, a 
savvy racketeer could target a competitor and injure him directly, yet 
escape liability to the competitor if a more immediate victim existed.19 
This problem highlights civil RICO’s past utility in cases of corporate 
looting and unfair competition, while emphasizing the need for a 
reasonable, practical application of the statute in the future. 
This Note discusses Anza’s impact on cases of corporate looting and 
unfair competition. Part II of this Note examines the mechanics of the 
statute and explores civil RICO’s legislative history. Part II also traces 
prior judicial attempts to limit the use of civil RICO, leading to the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection 
Corp.20 This Part then discusses pre-Anza cases of corporate looting and 
unfair competition, and concludes with a discussion of the Anza decision. 
Following this background, Part III analyzes Anza’s probable impact on 
cases of corporate looting and unfair competition, contrasting this impact 
with the purposes of the civil RICO provision. Part IV contains proposed 
 
 
 17. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 
941, 947 (1970) (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968 (2000)). Since RICO’s adoption, courts have 
endeavored to limit this expansion of civil RICO beyond traditional notions of organized crime. See 
Anza, 126 S. Ct. at 2004–05 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Numerous justices have expressed 
dissatisfaction with either the breadth of RICO’s application . . . or its general vagueness at outlining 
the conduct it is intended to prohibit.” (citations omitted)). To curb the use of civil RICO against 
“legitimate” businesses, courts experimented with extra-legislative limits to civil RICO, including 
requiring proof that the defendant was previously convicted of a predicate act and proof of a 
racketeering-enterprise injury. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1985) 
(reversing the Second Circuit’s imposition of these requirements on the plaintiff). For a critique of 
RICO’s extension to individuals engaged in protest activity, see Alexander M. Parker, Stretching 
RICO to the Limit and Beyond, 45 DUKE L.J. 819 (1996). 
 18. See Anza, 126 S. Ct. at 1997–98. 
 19. Id. at 2004 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 20. 503 U.S. 258 (1992). 
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judicial and legislative solutions to the problems Anza created. Finally, 
Part V summarizes the impact of Anza on civil RICO litigation. 
II. HISTORY 
A. Framework of the Statute 
The RICO statute was Congress’s response to a fear “that organized 
crime had begun to move from its traditional revenue raising activities 
such as gambling and prostitution, into what, on their face, were legitimate 
business activities.”21 RICO is a “combination of criminal penalties and 
civil remedies” intended to destroy “the corrupting influence of organized 
crime.”22  
The statute’s substantive prohibitions focus on undermining organized 
crime’s economic base by preventing its participation in legitimate 
business.23 Section 1962 effectuates this purpose by prohibiting (1) 
investing any proceeds gained from a “pattern of racketeering” into an 
“enterprise,”24 (2) acquiring an interest in an enterprise through a pattern 
of racketeering,25 (3) conducting or participating26 in the “conduct” of an 
 
 
 21. Robert K. Rasmussen, Introductory Remarks and a Comment on Civil RICO’s Remedial 
Provisions, 43 VAND. L. REV. 623, 624 (1990). 
 22. Organized Crime Control Hearings, supra note 1, at 172 (comments of the Department of 
Justice); see also id. at 170, 172 (“[T]he proposed statute would also authorize civil remedies modeled 
upon those found in the antitrust laws. . . . The combination of criminal penalties and civil remedies 
which has been highly effective in removing and preventing harmful behavior in the field of trade and 
commerce can and should be utilized to remove the corrupting influence of organized crime from 
American industry.”). 
 23. S. REP. NO. 91-617, at 1–2 (1969). 
 24. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (2000). Section 1962(a) provides:  
It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived, directly or 
indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful debt in 
which such person has participated as a principal within the meaning of section 2, title 18, 
United States Code, to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such income, or the 
proceeds of such income, in acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or operation 
of, any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign 
commerce. 
18 U.S.C. § 1962(a). Congress intended this prohibition to prevent money laundering by impeding the 
investment of such income in legitimate businesses. See Brittingham v. Mobil Corp., 943 F.2d 297, 
303 (3d Cir. 1991) (citing 116 CONG. REC. 35,199 (1970) (remarks of Rep. Fernand G. St. Germain); 
116 CONG. REC. 607 (1970) (remarks of Sen. Byrd)). Functionally, the statute attempts to render the 
racketeering proceeds useless by preventing reinvestment. For the prima face elements of proving a 
§ 1962(a) relationship, see Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 1153, 1188 (3d Cir. 1993). The 
Lightning Lube court found that the plaintiff had to prove “(1) that the defendant [had] received money 
from a pattern of racketeering activity; (2) [that the defendant had] invested that money in an 
enterprise; and (3) that the enterprise affected interstate commerce”). 
 25. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b) (“It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering 
activity or through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any 
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enterprise through a pattern of racketeering,27 and (4) conspiring to violate 
any of the above prohibitions.28  
The statute sets forth definitions that are vital to understanding the 
§ 1962 prohibitions. An “enterprise,” as defined in § 1961(4), can be either 
 
 
interest in or control of any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate 
or foreign commerce.”). To satisfy this subsection, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant acquired 
or maintained an interest in or control of an enterprise through racketeering. See Crowe v. Henry, 43 
F.3d 198, 205 (5th Cir. 1995) (“As to subsection (b) [of § 1962], a plaintiff must show that his injuries 
were proximately caused by a RICO person gaining an interest in, or control of, the enterprise through 
a pattern of racketeering activity.”); see also Lightning Lube, 4 F.3d at 1190 (“[A] plaintiff must show 
injury from the defendant’s acquisition or control of an interest in a RICO enterprise, in addition to 
injury from the predicate acts.”). For example, a plaintiff adequately alleged a violation of § 1962(b) 
when a lawyer committed “numerous predicate acts of mail fraud, wire fraud, financial institution 
fraud and theft of goods in interstate commerce” to gain control of a farmer’s property. Crowe, 43 F.3d 
at 204 (footnotes omitted). 
 26. The definition of “conduct or participate” was the subject of some debate among courts. The 
Supreme Court settled the debate in Reves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170 (1993), stating: 
In order to “participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of [and] enterprise’s affairs,” one 
must have some part in directing those affairs. Of course, the word “participate” makes clear 
that RICO liability is not limited to those with primary responsibility for the enterprise’s 
affairs, just as the phrase “directly or indirectly” makes clear that RICO liability is not limited 
to those with a formal position in the enterprise, but some part in directing the enterprise’s 
affairs is required. The “operation or management” test expresses this requirement in a 
formulation that is easy to apply. 
Reves, 507 U.S. at 179 (footnote omitted). In Reves, the Court found that an accounting firm that 
audited a company did not operate or control the enterprise. Id. at 172–75, 184–86. The accounting 
firm had failed to inform the board that the company had been insolvent, thereby depriving the board 
of its decision making power. Id. at 172–75. The Court found the accounting firm did not operate or 
control the enterprise because it did not make important decisions for the enterprise. Id. at 184–86. 
 In Aetna Casualty Surety Co. v. P & B Autobody, 43 F.3d 1546, 1558–61 (1st Cir. 1994), the court 
discussed the limits of the “associated with” element, see infra note 27, and the “operation or 
management” test in the context of an insurance fraud cause. The defendants were a consortium of 
mechanics and claimants who filed false claims with Aetna, an insurer. P & B Autobody, 43 F.3d at 
1551–52. The court held that the claimants were associated with the enterprise of Aetna because “[i]n 
ordinary usage, one who, for example, buys an insurance policy from an enterprise and depends on the 
solidarity of that enterprise, for protection against defined risks, has an association with, and may be 
said to have ‘associated with,’ the enterprise.” Id. at 1559. Addressing the “operation or management” 
test, the court found the defendant’s “activities caused Aetna employees having authority to do so to 
direct that other employees make payments Aetna otherwise would not have made,” a type of indirect 
participation. Id. 
 27. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (“It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any 
enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or 
participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of 
racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.”). 
 28. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (“It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the 
provisions of subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section.”). To prove a RICO conspiracy, a plaintiff must 
demonstrate that the defendant agreed to the conspiracy’s overall objective or participated in two 
predicate acts in furtherance of the conspiracy. United States v. Shenberg, 89 F.3d 1461, 1471 (11th 
Cir. 1996). In Shenberg, the court upheld a defendant’s RICO conspiracy conviction when it was 
proven that he agreed to a kickback scheme, under which judges appointed their friends to special 
public-defender positions in exchange for a cut of the fees. Id. at 1465–68. 
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a legally recognized enterprise (e.g., a corporation) or an association in 
fact (e.g., a drug cartel).29 A “pattern of racketeering,” defined in 
§ 1961(5), is the commission of two related predicate acts within a ten-
year period.30 These “predicate acts” are a list of violations of either 
general state law categories or specific federal laws,31 including mail 
fraud, immigration violations, securities laws, and drug laws.32 The 
predicate acts must be sufficiently related and pose a threat of continued 
criminality to satisfy the “pattern” requirement.33 A racketeer who violates 
 
 
 29. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (defining enterprise as including “any individual, partnership, 
corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact 
although not a legal entity”). Earlier versions of section 1961(4) neglected to include “associations in 
fact” expressly. However, Congress followed the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. 
Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580–87 (1981) and amended section 1961(4) to include the “associations in 
fact” language. In Turkette, the Court found that individuals who were associated in fact for the 
purpose of illegal drug trafficking, committing arsons, perpetrating mail fraud, bribing police officers, 
and obstructing justice constituted an enterprise. Id. at 579–80. 
 30. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (“‘[P]attern of racketeering activity’ requires at least two acts of 
racketeering activity, one of which occurred after the effective date of this chapter and the last of 
which occurred within ten years (excluding any period of imprisonment) after the commission of a 
prior act of racketeering activity.”). 
 31. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1). This section defines “racketeering activity” as 
(A) any act or threat involving murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, 
extortion, dealing in obscene matter, or dealing in a controlled substance or listed chemical 
. . . which is chargeable under State law and punishable by imprisonment for more than one 
year; (B) any act which is indictable under any of [certain enumerated] provisions of title 18, 
United States Code . . . [, including] Section 201 . . . . 
Id. The subsequent list of predicate acts includes bribery, mail fraud, counterfeiting, and a number of 
other related crimes. Id. For a discussion of the implications of the broad state-law categories, see 
United States v. Garner, 837 F.2d 1404, 1418 (7th Cir. 1987), finding that Congress intended the state 
category labels in section 1961 to refer to generic crimes, not to specific state statutes. 
 32. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1). 
 33. The Supreme Court defined the “pattern” requirement in H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell 
Telephone Co., 492 U.S. 229, 236–50 (1989). The Court identified two elements to consider in 
establishing a pattern: relatedness and continuity. Id. at 239. Relatedness, according to the Court, 
requires that the act have the same or similar purpose. Id. at 240. The continuity requirement mandates 
that the plaintiff show a continued threat of illegality: either that the activity continued for some 
substantial duration or would have continued in the future absent legal intervention. Id. at 240–43. In 
establishing this test, the Court attempted to ensure that the acts are related and not merely two isolated 
occurrences, thereby preventing application of RICO to garden variety frauds. Id. at 238–43. Justice 
Scalia found the “relatedness” and “continuity” concepts “about as helpful . . . as ‘life is a fountain.’” 
Id. at 252 (Scalia, J., concurring).  
 For a discussion of the impact of the Court’s pattern requirements and the ensuing confusion in 
the lower courts, see Bart A. Karwath, Note, Has the Constituency of Continuity Plus Relationship Put 
an End to RICO’s Pattern of Confusion?, 18 AM. J. CRIM. L. 201, 211–46 (1991). 
 For an example of application of the pattern requirement in the context of mail and wire fraud, see 
ePlus Technology, Inc. v. Aboud, 313 F.3d 166, 180–81 (4th Cir. 2002). The defendant in ePlus 
Technology sent multiple credit applications to the plaintiff and used telephone conversations to 
perpetrate the fraud, thereby violating the wire-fraud statutes. Id. at 181. The predicate acts were 
related because they were part of a broader scheme and continuous because they threatened to continue 
into the future. Id. at 182–83. 
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these provisions is subject to harsh criminal penalties, including fines, 
imprisonment for up to twenty years, and forfeiture of any property or 
interest in any property connected to an enterprise used in racketeering.34 
In addition to the criminal penalties, a racketeer could be liable for 
treble damages to any person injured by the racketeering.35 To recover 
these damages, a plaintiff must first prove a violation of one of the § 1962 
substantive prohibitions.36 Then, under § 1964, the plaintiff must prove 
three elements: first, that the racketeering caused an injury to the 
plaintiff’s business or property; second, that the racketeering was the 
actual cause of the injury;37 and third, that the racketeering was the 
proximate cause of the injury.38  
Courts construe the “injury to business or property” requirement 
literally.39 In most cases of corporate looting and unfair competition, this 
requirement is a non-issue because the plaintiff can clearly allege an injury 
to its business or property. For example, in Anza the plaintiff claimed that 
he had lost business due to the defendant’s tax evasion, clearly alleging an 
injury to his business.40 Courts typically reject claims that involve only 
personal injury or fail to allege business injury.41 
The plaintiff must then prove that the § 1962 violation was the actual 
cause of the injury to his business or property.42 The “actual cause” 
requirement simply requires proof “that the defendant violated § 1962, the 
plaintiff was injured, and the defendant’s violation was a ‘but for’ cause of 
 
 
 34. 18 U.S.C. § 1963.  
 35. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (“Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation 
of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefore in any appropriate United States district court and 
shall recover threefold the damages he sustains . . . .”). 
 36. Id. 
 37. Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 265–66 (1992). 
 38. See 1 KATHLEEN F. BRICKEY, CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY § 7A:05 (2d ed. 1991) (“To 
prove a civil RICO violation the plaintiff must establish all the elements of a criminal RICO offense. 
Those elements will, of course, vary depending on which part of section 1962 is alleged to have been 
violated and depending on whether the violation is alleged to have occurred through a pattern of 
racketeering activity or through collection of unlawful debt. The civil RICO plaintiff must, in addition, 
prove an injury to business or property by reason of the violation.”). 
 39. See Libertad v. Welch, 53 F.3d 428, 436–38 (1st Cir. 1995); see also Ibrahim v. Titan Corp., 
391 F. Supp. 2d 10, 19–20 (D.D.C. 2005) (denying RICO standing to detainees in an Iraqi prison 
facility, despite allegations U.S. military forces seized their money and weapons, because the detainees 
could not allege anything other than personal injuries). 
 40. Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 126 S. Ct. 1991, 1996–97 (2006). 
 41. See Libertad, 53 F.3d at 436–38. In Libertad, two women claimed personal injury because an 
antiabortion group blocked their access to a reproductive clinic. Id. at 433–34. The court determined 
that the two women lacked RICO standing because they failed to allege injury to business or property. 
Id. at 436. However, the doctors at the clinic had standing because the antiabortion group injured their 
business by causing appointment cancellations and property damage. Id. at 438. 
 42. Holmes, 503 U.S. at 265–66. 
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plaintiff's injury.”43 In cases of corporate looting or unfair competition, 
this requirement may be a hurdle to recovery because many different 
factors may account for losses to a business, including fluctuations in the 
market, individual customer preferences, and other complexities in the 
marketplace.44 
Proximate cause poses the greatest obstacle to recovery for a victim of 
unfair competition or corporate looting. Although the plain language of the 
statute appears to require no more than proof of actual cause, it is unlikely 
that “Congress meant to allow all factually injured plaintiffs to recover.”45 
Courts have developed a theory of proximate cause that limits a RICO 
plaintiff’s potential recovery based on common-law concepts of fairness 
and accountability.46 However, this concept differs from common-law 
applications of proximate cause because it requires an additional, 
ambiguous element: proof of the “directness” of the injury.47 The 
“directness” requirement, as applied in Holmes v. Securities Investor 
Protection Corp.,48 required proof of a direct injury that was not derivative 
of the injury of another.49 Anza changed the definition of “directness” by 
including the need to prove not only a direct injury, but also that the injury 
was the most immediate injury caused by the predicate act.50 Anza’s re-
definition of “directness” could make proof of proximate cause difficult in 
corporate looting and unfair competition cases because of these cases’ 
complexity and the increased likelihood that a more immediate victim 
exists.51 
The evolution of proximate cause reflects the concern of courts that 
RICO’s broad language makes it susceptible to expansive interpretation 
 
 
 43. Id. at 265–66. 
 44. Anza, 126 S. Ct. at 1997. 
 45. Holmes, 503 U.S. at 266. 
 46. Id. at 267–70. 
 47. Id. at 269. The term “directness” has been articulated in different ways by different courts. 
Holmes refers to this concept as “directness of relationship.” Id. at 269. Anza refers to this concept as 
the “directness requirement.” Anza, 126 S. Ct. at 1997. For simplicity’s sake, I refer to this concept as 
the “directness” requirement, except when specifically discussing the Court’s analysis in Holmes in 
Part II.C.2. 
 48. Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258 (1992). 
 49. See infra Parts II.C.2, II.D. 
 50. See infra Parts II.E, III. 
 51. See, e.g., Downstream Envtl., L.L.C. v. Gulf Coast Waste Disposal Auth., No. H-05-1865, 
2006 WL 1875959, at *6–7 (S.D. Tex. July 05, 2006) (finding that a plaintiff failed to satisfy Anza’s 
proximate cause requirement when it alleged that a competitor was illegally disposing of waste, 
thereby lowering its costs and gaining a larger market share). In the case of Downstream, there would 
be no antitrust protection unless the defendant had gained a controlling share of the market. See supra 
note 7 and accompanying text. Therefore, the plaintiff would be forced to choose between going out of 
business or participating in the illegal dumping. See infra note 158 and accompanying text. 
Washington University Open Scholarship











and abuse.52 Accordingly, courts have experimented with a variety of 
methods intended to prevent an explosion of civil RICO litigation.53 
Analysis of this phenomenon requires understanding first, the legislative 
history of the statute; second, the evolution of civil RICO’s proximate 
cause requirement; third, the application of proximate cause in two 
contexts (corporate looting and unfair competition); and finally, the impact 
of Anza.  
B. The Statute and its Purpose 
In 1970, Congress enacted the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations Act (“RICO”) to combat “racketeering activity.”54 The bill 
was a response to investigations by several government commissions that 
analyzed the economic aspect of organized crime.55 One of the early 
 
 
 52. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 506 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“In 
practice, this provision frequently has been invoked against legitimate businesses in ordinary 
commercial settings. . . . Many a prudent defendant, facing ruinous exposure, will decide to settle even 
a case with no merit. It is thus not surprising that civil RICO has been used for extortive purposes, 
giving rise to the very evils that it was designed to combat.”). 
 53. For a discussion of a modern example of this judicial curtailing of civil RICO’s breadth, see 
Michael A. Hanzman, Establishing Injury “By Reason of” Racketeering Activity, 77 FLA. B.J., Mar. 
2003, at 36, 36–43, which criticizes the Eleventh Circuit’s creation of a per se detrimental reliance rule 
in Sikes v. Teleline, Inc. USA, 281 F.3d 1350 (2002). Hanzman attacks the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion, 
which found that § 1964(c) required a plaintiff prove detrimental reliance on a predicate act. Hanzman, 
supra, at 36–43. Hanzman believes that “[l]itmus tests such as a per se detrimental reliance rule do not 
assist this type of inquiry because the ‘infinite variety of claims . . . make it virtually impossible to 
announce a black-letter rule that will dictate the result in every case.’” Id. at 40 (citations omitted). 
 54. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968 (2000); supra notes 1–3 and accompanying text. Professor G. 
Robert Blakey, who was the Chief Counsel of the Senate Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and 
Procedures of the United States Senate in 1969–70, when RICO was passed, drew five conclusions 
from his review of the legislative history:  
(1) Congress fully intended, after specific debate, to have RICO apply beyond any limiting 
concept like “organized crime” or “racketeering”; 
(2) Congress deliberately redrafted RICO outside of the antitrust statutes, so that it would not 
be limited by antitrust concepts like “competitive,” “commercial,” or “direct or indirect” 
injury;  
(3) Both immediate victims of racketeering activity and competing organizations were 
contemplated as civil plaintiffs for injunction, damage, and other relief;  
(4) Over specific objections raising issues of federal-state relations and crowded court 
dockets, Congress deliberately extended RICO to the general field of commercial and other 
fraud; and 
(5) Congress was well aware that it was creating important new federal criminal and civil 
remedies in a field traditionally occupied by common law fraud. 
G. Robert Blakey, The RICO Civil Fraud Action in Context: Reflections on Bennett v. Berg, 58 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 237, 280 (1982). 
 55. For a discussion of the various commissions and their findings, see ABA REPORT, supra note 
5, at 73–78 & n.70 (discussing the Kefauver Committee, the Katzenbach Commission, and the 
McClellan Committee). 
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Senate committees believed that the criminal syndicates of the country had 
joined to form “one loose national crime federation.”56 Later inquiry 
revealed that “organized crime is . . . extensively and deeply involved in 
legitimate business.”57 According to some estimates, by 1970 organized 
crime annually drained “billions of dollars from America’s economy by 
unlawful conduct and the illegal use of force, fraud, and corruption.”58 
During hearings on the bill, Congress noted that organized crime 
perpetrated this infiltration through various offensive means,59 including 
corporate looting and unfair competition through tax fraud.60 Congress 
feared that, without government intervention, ordinary citizens would no 
longer be able to “avoid the graver evils of organized crime—the 
corruption of our Government, the infiltration into our economy, the 
stifling of our freedoms.”61  
 
 
 56. COMM’N ON ORGANIZED CRIME, AM. BAR ASS’N, REPORT OF THE AMERICAN BAR 
ASSOCIATION COMMISSION ON ORGANIZED CRIME 6 (1951). 
 57. PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF 
CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 187 (1967) (“But organized crime is also extensively and deeply involved 
in legitimate business and in labor unions. Here it employs illegitimate methods—monopolization, 
terrorism, extortion, tax evasion—to drive out or control lawful ownership and leadership and to exact 
illegal profits from the public.”); see also H.R. REP. NO. 91-1549, at 1 (1970); 116 CONG. REC. 35,201 
(1970) (statement of Rep. Richard H. Poff) (“Whether the technique of infiltration is intimidation and 
violence or simply public purchase, the consequences of mob ownership of business concerns are 
always evil. Business competitors suffer unfair competition. Workers are the victims of sweetheart 
labor contracts. And consumers are the victims of inferior products and services, price-fixing and most 
of the other predatory practices and monopolies.”). 
 58. H.R. REP. NO. 91-1549, at 1; see also Organized Crime Control Hearings, supra note 1, at 
106 (statement of Sen. John McClellan) (“Involvement of La Costa Nostra leaders in legitimate 
businesses has become the rule rather than the exception. Indeed, Internal Revenue sources have 
revealed that among the 113 major organized crime figures in America, 98 are involved in 159 
businesses.”). 
 59. Organized Crime Control Hearings, supra note 1, at 106 (statement of Sen. John McClellan); 
see also 116 CONG. REC. 35,206 (1970) (statement of Rep. Donald D. Clancy) (“Organized crime . . . 
is gradually infiltrating and poisoning every phase of American life. It is corrupting our society, our 
economy, and our future. . . . It drains countless dollars from our economy, [and] it corrupts our free 
enterprise system . . . .”). 
 60. Organized Crime Control Hearings, supra note 1, at 106 (statement of Sen. John McClellan) 
(“While these few examples of the extent of organized crime infiltration of business are themselves 
disturbing from the point of view of economic concentration of power, the most offensive aspect of 
this infiltration is the means by which it is accomplished and maintained. . . . A corporation is bled of 
its assets, goods obtained by the corporation on credit are sold for a quick profit, and then the 
corporation is forced into bankruptcy while the criminals who infiltrated it disappear. . . . Income 
routinely is understated for tax purposes, so that mob businesses have competitive advantages over 
businesses which report all their income.”). 
 61. Id. at 78 (statement of Rep. William M. McCulloch) (noting the distinction between those 
who choose to partake of the vices offered by organized crime and ordinary citizens who abstain, and 
speculating that, in the near future, even those who choose to abstain would suffer from the evils of 
organized crime). 
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Responding to these fears, Senator John L. McClellan and Senator 
Roman L. Hruska introduced bills that Congress incorporated into Title IX 
of the Organized Crime Control Act.62 The bills proposed implementing 
new criminal penalties, strengthening existing legal tools, and ensuring 
that the government could use “‘all legitimate methods’” to attack “the 
economic base” of organized crime.63 Despite its wide-ranging goals, after 
three days of Senate debate the bill did not contain either a private cause of 
action or a treble damages provision.64 
Representative Steiger introduced the private treble damages provision 
when the bill was before the House of Representatives.65 The American 
Bar Association supported a treble damages provision, stating that the bill 
should include “the additional civil remedy of authorizing private damage 
suits based upon . . . the Clayton Act.”66 The final bill combined criminal 
and civil enforcement provisions67 that provided “enhanced sanctions and 
new remedies”68 to ameliorate perceived statutory inadequacies that had 
limited prior enforcement efforts.69 The criminal and civil provisions 
relied on the same core definitions and prohibited activities.70  
The civil provision (“civil RICO”) has two purposes: victim 
compensation and private enforcement.71 A treble damages provision 
 
 
 62. See S. REP. NO. 91-617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). 
 63. Id. at 76, 79. 
 64. See ABA REPORT, supra note 5, at 106. 
 65. See Organized Crime Control Hearings, supra note 1, at 520 (statement of Rep. Sam 
Steiger). 
 66. Id. at 543–44 (statement of ABA President-elect Edward L. Wright). 
 67. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1963–1964 (2000); 116 CONG. REC. 35,201 (1970) (statement of Rep. Richard 
H. Poff) (“[RICO] mobilizes both the criminal and civil mechanisms of the Sherman Act and other 
antitrust statutes against the barons of organized crime.”). 
 68. H.R. REP. NO. 91-1549, at 2 (1970). 
 69. Organized Crime Control Hearings, supra note 1, at 518 (statement of Rep. Sam Steiger) 
(“[T]he legislative tools and methods [then] available to the Executive Branch . . . [had] been proved 
by bitter experience not to be adequate to the task . . . .”). Professor Douglas E. Abrams describes 
President Nixon’s signing of the bill and his order to the Justice Department: 
October 15, 1970 was a cloudy day in Washington, D.C. Early that morning, President 
Richard M. Nixon took the short drive from the White House to the Great Hall at the 
Department of Justice Building. In a ceremony beginning shortly after 10:00 A.M., the 
President signed the Organized Crime Control Act (OCCA), which had received final 
congressional approval three days earlier. . . . Handing the signed bill to the Attorney General 
and Federal Bureau of Investigation director, the President proclaimed, “Gentlemen, I give 
you the tools. You do the job.” 
DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS, THE LAW OF CIVIL RICO 1–2 (1991) (citations omitted). 
 70. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1962 (2000); see also 1 BRICKEY, supra note 38, § 7A:04 (“The heart 
of a criminal RICO violation, section 1962, is also the core of a civil violation. To establish a civil 
claim, the plaintiff must prove all of the elements of a section 1962 violation.”). 
 71. Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549, 557 (2000) (“The object of civil RICO is thus not merely to 
compensate victims but to turn them into prosecutors, ‘private attorneys general,’ dedicated to 
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addresses victim compensation by providing victims a means to recover 
three times the amount of damages racketeering causes to their business or 
property.72 Senator McClellan proclaimed that the treble damages 
provision was “a major new tool in extirpating the baneful influence of 
organized crime in our economic life.”73 Congress believed the treble 
damages provision would not only protect victims of racketeering, but 
would also augment the criminal prohibitions74 by deputizing plaintiffs as 
“‘private attorneys general.’”75 Because the government can bring only “a 
very limited number of cases” with “limited resources,” private civil 
action serves to supplement prosecutorial shortfalls.76 Congress realized 
that victim-competitors of racketeers not only conserve government 
 
 
eliminating racketeering activity.” (quoting Klehr v. A.O. Smith Corp., 521 U.S. 179, 187 (1997))); 
see also Organized Crime Control Hearings, supra note 1, at 520 (statement of Rep. Sam Steiger) 
(“[T]hose who have been wronged by organized crime should at least be given access to a legal 
remedy. In addition, the availability of such a remedy would enhance the effectiveness of [RICO’s 
criminal] prohibitions.”).  
 72. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (“Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation 
of section 1962 of this chapter . . . shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the 
suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee . . . .”); see 116 CONG REC. 35,295 (1970) (statement of 
Rep. Richard H. Poff) (“In addition, at the suggestion of the gentleman from Arizona (Mr. STEIGER) 
and also the American Bar Association and others, the committee has provided that private persons 
injured by reason of a violation of the title may recover treble damages in Federal courts—another 
example of the antitrust remedy being adapted for use against organized criminality.”). 
 73. 116 CONG. REC. 25,190 (1970) (statement of Sen. John McClellan); see also Organized 
Crime Control Hearings, supra note 1, at 107 (statement of Sen. John McClellan) (“[RICO] contains 
important civil provisions which in some respects are superior to the criminal process’ remedies and 
procedures. As to remedies, [RICO] adapts the equitable remedies long applied by courts of equity and 
brought to their fullest development by federal courts applying the antitrust laws . . . . In extreme 
cases, the civil remedies could include even the court-ordered dissolution of a business found to be 
corrupted from top to bottom.”). 
 74. Organized Crime Control Hearings, supra note 1, at 520 (statement of Rep. Sam Steiger); 
116 CONG. REC. 35,346–47 (statement of Rep. Sam Steiger) (“It is the intent of this body, I am certain, 
to see that innocent parties who are the victims of organized crime have a right to obtain proper 
redress.”). 
 75. Rotella, 528 U.S. at 557 (citation omitted); see also 115 CONG. REC. 6993 (1969) (statement 
of Sen. Roman Hruska) (“Patterned closely after the Sherman Act, [the bill] provides for private treble 
damage suits, prospective injunctive relief, unlimited discovery procedures and all the other devices 
which bring to bear the full panoply of our antitrust machinery in aid of the businessman competing 
with organized crime.”) (discussing a bill that was predecessor to the civil RICO provision). 
 Another important by-product of the civil provisions was the variety of procedures available in 
civil actions. Congress considered the civil system to be a more efficient investigative tool for 
examining business records and transactions. Organized Crime Control Hearings, supra note 1, at 
519–20 (statement of Rep. Sam Steiger) (“More important [sic], [RICO] takes the innovative step of 
applying the civil procedures and remedies developed in anti-trust cases to the problem of organized 
crime. The primary procedure borrowed from anti-trust experience is the civil investigative demand, a 
most effective investigative tool for examining business transactions and records.”). 
 76. Neil Feldman, Note, Spiraling Out of Control: Ramifications of Reading RICO Broadly, 65 
DEF. COUNS. J. 116, 120 (1998). 
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resources by serving as its proxy,77 but also have a strong economic 
incentive to protect their own interests by rapidly detecting and halting 
racketeering that undermines the legitimacy of the marketplace.78 The 
“expected benefit of suppressing racketeering activity” justified treble 
damages.79  
C. The Judicial Evolution of the Proximate Cause Requirement 
Congress broadly drafted RICO’s language to give courts and law 
enforcement freedom to implement the statute’s remedial purpose.80 Anza 
is the latest Supreme Court case in a series that has tried to curtail abuse of 
this broad language by defining the limits of civil RICO.81 The initial 
attempts to check the use of civil RICO stemmed from a fear that plaintiffs 
had expanded civil RICO beyond the purposes envisioned by Congress.82 
Earlier courts sought to allay this fear by engrafting fabricated elements 
into the statute, such as the “prior criminal conviction” requirement, to 
heighten the plaintiff’s burden of proof.83 After the Supreme Court 
rejected these approaches in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.,84 courts turned 
to common-law concepts of proximate cause as an acceptable limit to the 
scope of civil RICO.85 Anza is the next step in the evolution of the 
proximate cause requirement. Although earlier courts used proximate 
cause to limit recovery appropriately, Anza may have gone too far. 
 
 
 77. The private right of action is available to “[a]ny person injured in his business or property by 
reason of a violation” of RICO. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). 
 78. See Organized Crime Control Hearings, supra note 1, at 520 (statement of Rep. Sam 
Steiger). 
 79. Rotella, 528 U.S. at 558. For a discussion of law enforcement’s inability to “do the whole 
job,” see Blakey & Perry, supra note 5, at 912–16. 
 80. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 
941, 947 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968 (2000)).  
 81. See Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 126 S. Ct. 1991, 2004–05 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see 
also supra note 16; see also, e.g., Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 499 (1985); 
Commercial Cleaning Servs., L.L.C. v. Colin Serv. Sys., Inc., 271 F.3d 374, 380 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing 
Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268).  
 82. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482, 494 (2d Cir. 1984), rev’d, 473 U.S. 479 
(1985).  
 83. See Sedima, 473 U.S. at 493 (reversing the Second Circuit’s fabricated requirements). 
 84. 473 U.S. 479, 493, 500 (1985). 
 85. See Holmes, 503 U.S. at 267–68. 
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1. Initial Judicial Restrictions 
Many courts have attempted to narrow civil RICO’s scope because 
they believe “that civil RICO’s evolution is undesirable.”86 As plaintiffs 
began using civil RICO against a variety of defendants, lower courts 
worried that civil RICO had expanded into areas “far afield from the battle 
against organized crime.”87 In response, courts developed different 
methods to limit the expansion of RICO, experimenting with various 
judicial solutions: an “organized-crime nexus” requirement,88 a 
“competitive injury” requirement,89 a “racketeering-enterprise injury” 
requirement,90 and a “prior criminal conviction” requirement.91 
Courts rejected the “organized-crime nexus” and the “competitive 
injury” requirements because they contravened congressional intent and 
the plain language of the statute.92 The “organized-crime nexus” 
requirement required plaintiffs to prove a substantial link between 
organized crime and the enterprise.93 This meant that a plaintiff had to 
prove that organized crime was substantially involved with the enterprise 
that was engaging in the racketeering.94 Courts rejected this concept, inter 
alia, because Congress had explicitly considered, and rejected, an 
amendment that proposed to limit RICO’s applicability to “La Cosa 
Nostra,” a pseudonym for organized crime.95 The “competitive injury” 
 
 
 86. Anza, 126 S. Ct. at 2004 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citations omitted); see also supra note 16. 
 87. Sedima, 741 F.2d at 492. G. Robert Blakey and Thomas Perry, however, debunk what they 
call “the Organized Crime Myth,” noting that not only did Congress design RICO to deal with all 
forms of enterprise criminality, but that the Supreme Court has recognized this purpose expressly. 
Blakey & Perry, supra note 5, at 860–68. 
 88. See, e.g., Hokama v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 566 F. Supp. 636, 643 (C.D. Cal. 1983). 
 89. See, e.g., N. Barrington Dev., Inc. v. Fanslow, 547 F. Supp. 207, 210–11 (N.D. Ill. 1980). 
 90. See, e.g., Waste Recovery Corp. v. Mahler, 566 F. Supp. 1466, 1468–69 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). 
 91. See, e.g., Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 493 (1985) (striking down the prior 
criminal conviction requirement). 
 92. See Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 719 F.2d 5, 21 (2d Cir. 1983) (rejecting the organized-
crime nexus requirement because courts should not impose their own understanding of “organized 
crime” upon broad remedial legislation); Bunker Ramo Corp. v. United Bus. Forms, Inc. 713 F.2d 
1272, 1288 (7th Cir. 1983) (rejecting the competitive-injury requirement because it violated the plain 
language and Congressional intent of RICO). 
 93. Some district courts required plaintiffs to prove that there was a substantial and cognizable 
connection between the enterprise and organized crime. See Hokama, 566 F. Supp. at 643–44; 
Waterman S.S. Corp. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 256, 260 (E.D. La. 1981); Adair v. 
Hunt Int’l Res. Corp., 526 F. Supp. 736, 747 (N.D. Ill. 1981); Noonan v. Granville-Smith, 537 F. 
Supp. 23, 29 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Barr v. WUI/TAS, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 109, 112–13 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). 
 94. See Moss, 719 F.2d at 21. 
 95. The Second Circuit provides a brief summary of Congress’s rejection of the “La Cosa 
Nostra” label: 
Similarly, the Act’s legislative history supports a rejection of this “organized crime” element. 
During the House debates on RICO, Congressman Biaggi proposed an amendment that 
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requirement required the plaintiff to prove that he suffered an injury 
resulting from unfair competition in the marketplace.96 Courts eventually 
dismissed both of these requirements as judicial overreaching that vitiated 
Congress’s intent.97 
However, the circuits disagreed about the legitimacy of the 
“racketeering-enterprise injury” and “prior criminal conviction” 
requirements.98 Courts that adhered to the “racketeering-enterprise injury” 
requirement stated that a plaintiff had to prove an injury that was separate 
and distinct from the injury or injuries caused by the predicate acts.99 
According to these courts, the plaintiff had to show that the injury did not 
stem from the predicate act, but rather resulted from an arbitrary and ill-
 
 
sought to limit the application of RICO to Mafia and La Cosa Nostra organizations. 116 
Cong. Rec. 35,343 (1970). The amendment was vigorously attacked on constitutional 
grounds. Congressman Celler objected that such terms were “imprecise, uncertain, and 
unclear” and that mere membership in an organization should not be punished. Id. at 35,343–
44 (1970). Congressman Poff (the bill’s sponsor in the House) objected that such an 
amendment might violate the Supreme Court’s rulings that struck down statutes which 
created status offenses . . . . 116 Cong. Rec. 35,344 (1970). 
Moss, 719 F.2d at 21. 
 96. N. Barrington Dev. Inc. v. Fainslow, 547 F. Supp. 207, 211 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (“[P]laintiff must 
allege how it was injured competitively by the RICO violation in order to state a cause of action under 
§ 1964(c).”). Courts have ascribed different labels to the “competitive injury” requirement, but still 
generally insist on the type of injury the North Barrington court required. See King v. Lasher, 572 F. 
Supp. 1377, 1382 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (requiring injury resulting from the operation or acquisition of an 
enterprise); Bankers Trust Company v. Feldesman, 566 F. Supp. 1235, 1241 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) 
(requiring antitrust-type competitive injury); Van Schaick v. Church of Scientology of Cal., Inc., 535 
F. Supp. 1125, 1137 & n.11 (D. Mass. 1982) (requiring commercial or business injury); Johnsen v. 
Rogers, 551 F. Supp. 281, 285 (C.D. Cal. 1982) (requiring commercial or business injury); Harper v. 
New Japan Sec. Int’l, Inc., 545 F. Supp. 1002, 1007–08 (C.D. Cal. 1982) (“[I]njury of the type the 
RICO statute was intended to prevent.”). But see Gitterman v. Vitoulis, 564 F. Supp. 46, 49 (S.D.N.Y. 
1982). 
 97. See Moss, 719 F.2d at 21; Bunker Ramo, 713 F.2d at 1288. 
 98. Many courts believed that the statute called for a racketeering-enterprise injury. See Bankers 
Trust Co. v. Rhoades, 741 F.2d 511, 516–17 (2d Cir. 1984) (“[I]f a complaint alleges a proprietary 
injury that is caused by the defendant’s predicate acts, rather than by its use of a pattern of racketeering 
activity in connection with a RICO enterprise, the injury cannot be said to have been caused by ‘a 
violation of section 1962.’”); Alexander Grant & Co. v. Tiffany Indus., Inc., 742 F.2d 408, 413 (8th 
Cir. 1984) (finding that RICO claim requires some unspecified element beyond injury stemming from 
the predicate acts). But see Haroco, Inc. v. Am. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. of Chi., 747 F.2d 384, 398–99 
(7th Cir. 1984) (rejecting the racketeering enterprise injury requirement). Other courts believed that 
plaintiffs had standing only if there was a prior criminal conviction. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex 
Co., 741 F.2d 482, 496–502 (2d Cir. 1984), rev’d, Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 484 
(1985). 
 99. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 484. See also Waste Recovery Corp. v. Mahler, 566 F. Supp. 1466, 
1468–69 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Barker v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London, 564 F. Supp. 352, 358 (E.D. 
Mich. 1983); Guerrero v. Katzen, 571 F. Supp. 714, 718 (D.D.C. 1983) (injury “by reason of a [RICO] 
violation”); Landmark Sav. & Loan v. Loeb Rhoades, Hornblower & Co., 527 F. Supp. 206, 208–09 
(E.D. Mich. 1981) (requiring racketeering-enterprise injury). 
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defined concept of “organized criminality.”100 To satisfy the “prior 
criminal conviction” requirement, plaintiffs had to prove that the 
defendant had been criminally convicted of the underlying predicate act 
prior to the civil action.101  
The Supreme Court addressed and rejected these initial judicial 
restrictions in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Corp.,102 overturning the Second 
Circuit’s requirements that a plaintiff prove a prior criminal conviction103 
and a racketeering-enterprise injury.104 The Court found that the plain 
language of the statute did not require a prior criminal conviction,105 but 
instead required proof of the predicate act by a preponderance of the 
evidence.106 The Court reasoned that requiring a prior criminal conviction 
frustrated the remedial purpose of the statute and did violence to the plain 
language of the provision.107 The Second Circuit’s interpretation would 
 
 
 100. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 484–85. 
 101. Id. at 485. 
 102. Id. at 483–84. The court briefly summarized the complicated scheme involved in the case: 
In 1979, petitioner Sedima, a Belgian corporation, entered into a joint venture with 
respondent Imrex Co. to provide electronic components to a Belgian firm. The buyer was to 
order parts through Sedima; Imrex was to obtain the parts in this country and ship them to 
Europe. The agreement called for Sedima and Imrex to split the net proceeds. Imrex filled 
roughly $8 million in orders placed with it through Sedima. Sedima became convinced, 
however, that Imrex was presenting inflated bills, cheating Sedima out of a portion of its 
proceeds by collecting for nonexistent expenses. 
Id. 
 103. Id. at 493 (“[W]e can find no support in the statute’s history, its language, or considerations 
of policy for a requirement that a private treble-damages action under § 1964(c) can proceed only 
against a defendant who has already been criminally convicted . . . . [N]o such requirement exists.”). 
 104. Id. at 495 (“We need not pinpoint the Second Circuit’s precise holding, for we perceive no 
distinct ‘racketeering injury’ requirement.”). Contra Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482, 503 
(2d Cir. 1984), rev’d, 473 U.S. 479. 
 105. Debunking the prior criminal conviction requirement, the Court noted, “The word 
‘conviction’ does not appear in any relevant portion of the statute.” Sedima, 473 U.S. at 488. The 
Court held that the word “violation,” which the circuit court relied upon in its decision, did not imply a 
criminal conviction. Id. at 488–90 (citing United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 249–50 (1980)). 
 106. Id. at 491 (“We are not at all convinced that the predicate acts must be established beyond a 
reasonable doubt in a proceeding under § 1964(c). In a number of settings, conduct that can be 
punished as criminal only upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt will support civil sanctions under a 
preponderance standard . . . . There is no indication that Congress sought to depart from this general 
principle here.”).  
 107. Id. at 493. The Court discussed Congress’s underlying policy concerns: 
 Finally, we note that a prior-conviction requirement would be inconsistent with 
Congress’s underlying policy concerns. Such a rule would severely handicap potential 
plaintiffs. A guilty party may escape conviction for any number of reasons—not least among 
them the possibility that the Government itself may choose to pursue only civil remedies. 
Private attorney general provisions such as § 1964(c) are in part designed to fill prosecutorial 
gaps. This purpose would be largely defeated . . . if private suits could be maintained only 
against those already brought to justice.”  
Id. (citation omitted). 
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have left a plaintiff’s right to sue subject to the discretion of a prosecutor, 
whose decision not to prosecute may be based on factors other than the 
guilt of the accused.108 
The Court similarly rejected the Second Circuit’s “racketeering-
enterprise injury” requirement.109 The Court found that injuries caused by 
the defendant’s commission of § 1961(1) predicate acts satisfied civil 
RICO’s requirements, even absent a separate racketeering injury.110 The 
Second Circuit had required the plaintiff to prove an injury caused by 
“organized criminality,” denying recovery for injuries caused solely by the 
predicate act.111 The Court rejected this approach because it was 
“unhelpfully tautological.”112 Because Congress intended to deter 
racketeering by punishing the injuries caused by the predicate acts,113 the 
Court found the Second Circuit’s reading of § 1964 overly restrictive and 
admonished lower courts to read RICO “liberally . . . to effectuate its 
remedial purposes.”114 
2. Holmes—Invoking Proximate Cause 
Although the Court in Sedima acknowledged a perceived undesirable 
expansion of civil RICO, it did not propose a solution.115 Lacking 
direction, lower courts focused on issues of causation by addressing 
differences between direct and indirect victims.116 The circuits split: some 
 
 
 108. See id. 
 109. Id. at 494–97. 
 110. Id. at 497 (“[T]he compensable injury necessarily is the harm caused by predicate acts 
sufficiently related to constitute a pattern . . . . Any recoverable damages occurring by reason of a 
violation of § 1962(c) will flow from commission of the predicate acts.”). 
 111. Id. at 484–85, 494. 
 112. Id. at 494. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 498 (“Far from effectuating these [remedial] purposes, the narrow readings offered by 
the dissenters and the court below would in effect eliminate § 1964(c) from the statute.”); see also 
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 941, 947 
(1970) (“[RICO must] be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes.”). 
 115. In dictum, the Court voiced concerns about the expansion of the civil RICO action. Sedima, 
473 U.S. at 499. The Court noted that plaintiffs had used the civil provision primarily against 
legitimate business in fraud cases rather than against mobsters and organized criminals. Id. The Court 
noted that “this defect—if defect it is—is inherent in the statute as written, and its correction must lie 
with Congress.” Id. The Court acknowledged that the use of civil RICO had evolved into something 
different from the enactors’ intent, but disagreed with the Second Circuit’s “remedy.” Id. at 499–500.  
 116. Courts defined a direct victim as one who incurs injury directly from the racketeer’s actions, 
while an indirect victim’s injuries result from the injuries of a third party. See Morast v. Lance, 807 
F.2d 926, 933 (11th Cir. 1987) (holding that plaintiff only has standing to sue under civil RICO if its 
injuries flowed directly from predicate acts); Blount Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Walter E. Heller & Co., 819 
F.2d 151, 152 (6th Cir. 1987) (requiring plaintiff show that he relied directly on misstatements by 
defendant to prove mail-fraud injury). But see O’Malley v. O’Neill, 887 F.2d 1557, 1563 n.9, 1564 
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required plaintiffs to prove direct injury,117 while others allowed both 
direct and indirect victims to recover.118  
Again faced with inconsistent circuit decisions on the limits of civil 
RICO, the Supreme Court interceded in Holmes v. Securities Investor 
Protection Corp. and adopted a “proximate cause” requirement.119 The 
plaintiff in Holmes alleged that the defendant participated in a stock-
manipulation scheme, defrauding two broker-dealers.120 The plaintiff, the 
Securities Investor Protection Corporation,121 argued that because it 
advanced $13 million to cover the claims of customers of the defrauded 
broker-dealers,122 it was subrogated to the rights of the broker-dealers who 
had not purchased manipulated securities.123  
The Court rejected this argument, holding that a proper interpretation 
of civil RICO required proof of both an actual injury and proximate 
cause.124 The Court began its analysis by noting that the legislative history 
of RICO revealed that Congress had patterned RICO after antitrust 
provisions in the Clayton Act.125 Therefore, the Court reasoned, RICO, 
 
 
(11th Cir. 1989) (Anderson, J., specially concurring) (doubting that Morast is faithful to Sedima); 
Alexander Grant & Co. v. Tiffany Indus., Inc., 742 F.2d 408, 412 (8th Cir. 1984) (“We find no 
legislative history supporting the direct-indirect dichotomy . . . .”). 
 117. See 1 BRICKEY, supra note 38, § 7A:14 n.100; see, e.g., Morast, 807 F.2d at 933; Pelletier v. 
Zweifel, 921 F.2d 1465, 1499 (11th Cir. 1991) (“We . . . hold[] that a plaintiff has standing . . . only if 
his injury flowed directly from the commission of the predicate acts”); Nodine v. Textron, Inc. 819 
F.2d 347, 349 (1st Cir. 1987) (rejecting a retaliatory discharge claim because it did not flow from the 
RICO violation). For a collection of district court cases, see ABA REPORT, supra note 5, at 284–86 
nn.436–37. 
 118. See Zervas v. Faulkner, 861 F.2d 823, 834 (5th Cir. 1988) (finding that a direct nexus 
between the injury and predicate act may not always be required, but acknowledging the need for some 
limit); Sperber v. Boesky, 849 F.2d 60, 63 (2d Cir. 1988) (assuming that some indirect injuries are 
covered by RICO, but declining to extend it to the plaintiff sub judice). 
 119. Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 267–79 (1992). 
 120. Id. at 261. 
 121. See Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa–78lll (2000). The 
Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (SIPA) authorized the formation of the private, non-profit 
Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC), requiring registered brokers to become “members.” 
Id. § 78ccc. When the SIPC determines that a member is failing to meet its obligations, it may ask for 
a protective decree. Id. § 78eee(a)(3). Once the court grants the petition, it appoints a trustee charged 
with liquidating the member’s business. Id. §§ 78eee(b)(1)–(3). If the liquidated property is 
inadequate, the SIPC may advance up to $500,000 per customer to the trustee to satisfy those claims. 
Id. § 78fff-3(a). 
 122. Holmes, 503 U.S. at 262–63. 
 123. Id. at 270. 
 124. Id. at 268 (“Here we use ‘proximate cause’ to label generically the judicial tools used to limit 
a person’s responsibility for the consequences of that person’s own acts. At bottom, the notion of 
proximate cause reflects ‘ideas of what justice demands, or of what is administratively possible and 
convenient.’” (quoting W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON, & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON 
LAW OF TORTS § 41, at 264 (5th ed. 1984))). 
 125. Holmes, 503 U.S. at 267 (“We have repeatedly observed . . . that Congress modeled 
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like the Clayton Act, should incorporate the common law’s general 
limitation that allows recovery to only the “first step.”126 However, the 
Court’s “proximate cause” requirement went beyond the common-law 
notion by applying a concept that the Court labeled “directness of 
relationship.”127 This concept limited recovery to people who suffered 
direct injury, distinguishing them from victims whose injury was merely 
derivative of an injury of another.128 According to Holmes, proximate 
cause limited recovery to only those victims whom the racketeering 
directly injured.129 For example, if D’s racketeering caused injury to A and 
B, they could recover. If A’s or B’s injury also caused C to be injured, C 
would be an indirect victim and could not recover.  
The Court gave three rationales for its directness requirement.130 First, 
the Court was concerned that allowing more remote recovery would make 
calculating damages too difficult and speculative.131 Second, the Court 
worried about the risk of multiple recoveries.132 Third, the Court reasoned, 
“directly injured victims can generally be counted on to vindicate the law 
as private attorneys general, without any of the problems attendant upon 
suits by plaintiffs injured more remotely.”133 Holmes thus focused the 
lower courts’ attention on issues of proximate cause.134  
 
 
§ 1964(c) on the civil-action provision of the federal antitrust laws, § 4 of the Clayton Act, which 
reads in relevant part that ‘any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of 
anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefore . . . and shall recover threefold the damages 
by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee.’” (second ellipsis in 
original)). 
 126. Id. at 271–72 (“As we said, however, . . . quoting Justice Holmes, ‘“The general tendency of 
the law, in regard to damages at least, is not to go beyond the first step.”’” (quoting Associated Gen. 
Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 534 (1983))). 
 127. Id. at 269. 
 128. Id. at 270–74. 
 129. Id. at 268–69. 
 130. Id. at 269–70. 
 131. Id. at 269 (“[T]he less direct an injury is, the more difficult it becomes to ascertain the 
amount of a plaintiff’s damages attributable to the violation, as distinct from other, independent, 
factors.”). 
 132. Id. (“[R]ecognizing claims of the indirectly injured would force courts to adopt complicated 
rules apportioning damages among plaintiffs removed at different levels of injury from the violative 
acts, to obviate the risk of multiple recoveries.”). 
 133. Id. at 269–70. 
 134. See Blue Cross and Blue Shield of N.J., Inc. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 36 F. Supp. 2d. 560, 573–
84 (2d Cir. 1999). 
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D. Civil RICO Applied Pre-Anza 
1. Proximate Cause and Corporate Looting 
The Holmes decision changed the way courts addressed corporate 
looting cases under civil RICO. Prior to Holmes, civil RICO played an 
important role in protecting victims from white-collar crime.135 State 
common-law jurisprudence was “not adequate to deal with sophisticated 
forms of fraud” because it developed under “prevailing philosophies of 
laissez faire and caveat emptor.”136 Civil RICO lowered the common law 
clear and convincing burden of proof to a preponderance of the evidence 
standard.137 Additionally, civil RICO provided treble damages and 
attorney’s fees, which made difficult-to-prove white-collar claims worth 
litigating.138  
In the post-Holmes environment, courts struggled to apply the Holmes 
“directness” requirement in the context of corporate looting.139 Courts 
 
 
 135. For an example of how a plaintiff used civil RICO in the corporate looting context before the 
Holmes decision, see Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades, 859 F.2d 1096 (2d Cir. 1988). In Bankers Trust, 
the Second Circuit allowed a creditor to bring a civil RICO claim against the debtor corporation’s 
officers who had defrauded creditors by concealing over three million dollars in assets. Bankers Trust, 
859 F.2d at 1098–1100, 1101. The court reasoned that the defendant’s conduct—which included 
bribery, perjury, fraud, and bankruptcy fraud—directly caused the creditor’s financial loss. Id. at 1101. 
The court held that the creditor had standing to bring the case, notwithstanding that the bankrupt 
debtor corporation was also injured, noting, “if Bankers [the creditor] was injured by defendants’ acts, 
. . . it has standing to bring a RICO claim, regardless of the fact that a bankrupt BAC [the debtor] 
might also have suffered an identical injury for which it has a similar right of recovery.” Id.  
 136. Blakey & Perry, supra note 5, at 909–13. Despite the common law’s neglect of these 
plaintiffs, some commentators advocate narrowing civil RICO, leaving victim protection and 
compensation to other statutes. See, for example, Feldman, supra note 76, at 119–20 for a discussion 
of the perceived overexpansion of civil RICO in the commercial-fraud and abortion-protestor contexts. 
Feldman believes that courts have allowed plaintiffs to use civil RICO in cases outside of Congress’s 
original intent. Feldman also believes that most commercial-fraud cases are cases involving ordinary 
fraud that therefore do not deserve the remedy of treble damages. He proposes limiting civil RICO to 
class action victims who qualify under Rule 23(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to limit 
the availability of the remedy. Feldman, supra, at 120. 
 137. Blakey & Perry, supra note 5, at 910 n.157. Although RICO filled a void in both state law 
and bankruptcy law, it should be noted that courts hesitate to allow RICO claims in the bankruptcy 
context due to a fear of upsetting bankruptcy judges’ distribution of assets. See Dana Molded Prods. 
Inc. v. Brodner, 58 BR. 576, 579 (N.D. Ill. 1986). 
 138. See ABA REPORT, supra note 5, at 63. 
 139. See Bivens Gardens Office Bldg., Inc. v. Barnett Banks of Fla., Inc., 140 F.3d 898, 908 (11th 
Cir. 1998) (finding that a plaintiff failed to allege a direct injury for skimmed profits, but was directly 
injured by the illegal sale of corporate assets); GICC Capital Corp. v. Tech. Fin. Group, Inc., 30 F.3d 
289, 293 (2d Cir. 1994) (“[T]he . . . timing . . . and the rapacious nature of the alleged looting—fairly 
posit the directness of injury required for RICO standing.”); Bankers Trust, 859 F.2d at 1101 (“[I]f [the 
creditor] was injured by defendants’ acts, . . . it has standing to bring a RICO claim, regardless of the 
fact that [the debtor] might also have suffered an identical injury for which it has a similar right of 
recovery.”). But see Hamid v. Price Waterhouse, 51 F.3d 1411, 1420 (9th Cir. 1995) (“The creditor’s 
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focused on whether the creditor’s injury was direct or derivative of the 
looted corporation’s injury. 140 Generally, courts found that injury to 
creditors was derivative of the injury to the corporation.141 Courts also 
hesitated to award damages if a corporation went bankrupt because the 
courts did not want to upset the bankruptcy court’s distribution,142 arguing 
that creditor use of civil RICO against debtor corporations diminished the 
general distribution fund, punishing other creditors rather than the 
racketeers.143  
Despite this general rejection of creditor claims, some courts 
recognized that a creditor could suffer a direct injury in some exceptional 
circumstances.144 The distinguishing feature in these exceptional 
circumstances was the intent of the racketeer: whether the racketeer 
directed the racketeering activity at the company or the creditors.145 
The Eleventh Circuit used the Holmes directness requirement to 
evaluate a creditor’s civil RICO standing when a debtor/racketeer 
 
 
injury is derivative of that of the corporation and is not caused proximately by the RICO violations.” 
(quoting Manson v. Stacescu, 11 F.3d 1127, 1130 (2d Cir. 1993)). 
 140. See Bivens Gardens, 140 F.3d at 908 (finding that stockholders had derivative standing to sue 
under civil RICO for damages caused by corporate looting by the head of the corporation); compare 
GICC Capital, 30 F.3d at 293–94 (finding the creditors directly injured by corporate looting), with 
Hamid, 51 F.3d at 1420 (finding that a creditor’s injury is generally derivative of the corporation’s 
injury). 
 141. Courts followed this general rule notwithstanding that the legislative history seems to 
contemplate creditor recovery in corporate looting cases. See Organized Crime Control Hearings, 
supra note 1, at 106 (statement of Sen. John McClellan); supra note 60. 
 142. Popkin v. Jacoby (In re Sunrise Sec. Litig.), 916 F.2d 874, 887–88 (3d Cir. 1990). 
 143. Hamid, 51 F.3d at 1420–21 (“[The plaintiff’s] claims, if allowed in this lawsuit, would 
enable them to jump ahead of other creditors in priority and obtain greater shares of the failed bank’s 
assets and of the assets of any wrongdoers who may owe money to the failed bank on account of their 
wrongs. . . . [The plaintiffs’] attempt to jump in line ahead of other creditors . . . is rebuffed here.”). 
 144. Compare Manson, 11 F.3d at 1130 (“Creditors of a bankrupt corporation, however, generally 
do not have standing under RICO. . . . The creditor generally sustains injury only because he has a 
claim against the corporation. The creditor’s injury is derivative of that of the corporation and is not 
caused proximately by the RICO violations.”), with Bankers Trust, 859 F.2d at 1099–1101, 1105 
(holding that creditors of a bankrupt company suffered a direct injury when they were forced to defend 
against lawsuits filed to harass them, the debtor made fraudulent conveyances to insulate its property 
from creditors, and the debtor attempted to inflict monetary loss on the creditor), and First Capital 
Asset Mgmt., Inc. v. Brickellbush, Inc., 218 F. Supp. 2d 369, 383 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“It seems entirely 
foreseeable that these acts designed to hide assets and obtain a wrongful discharge of debts would 
cause creditors to expend money to block such a discharge and recover any fraudulently transferred 
assets. In other words, the adversary proceeding, with its attendant costs, may be viewed as an 
expected and natural consequence of the type of conduct allegedly engaged in by [the defendant]. And 
it seems that the alleged predicate acts enumerated above played a substantial role in plaintiffs’ 
decision to pursue the adversary proceeding: all of them were mentioned by Judge Gallet as grounds 
upon which plaintiffs sought denial of [the defendant’s] petition. Accordingly, plaintiffs have standing 
to pursue their substantive RICO claim against [the defendant] because of the [l]egal [f]ees injury.” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
 145. Bivens Gardens, 140 F.3d at 908. 
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fraudulently attempted to sell a corporation’s assets below market value 
during bankruptcy.146 The court reasoned that the sale of the asset affected 
creditors in a sufficiently direct manner because it directly diminished the 
funds available for distribution.147 The court held that the sale of the asset 
at a higher price would have directly benefited the creditors; therefore, a 
sale at below market price likewise directly injured these creditors.148 
Similarly, in GICC Capital Corp. v. Technology Finance Group, 
Inc.,149 the Second Circuit found that a creditor satisfied the Holmes 
proximate cause test when he alleged that a debtor/racketeer fraudulently 
issued a promissory note, knowing that corporate looting had already 
rendered the note worthless.150 Noting that a creditor cannot generally sue 
for injury visited upon the company,151 the court felt that the timing and 
magnitude of the fraud required a finding of directness.152 
 
 
 146. Bivens Gardens, 140 F.3d at 902–03. The plaintiff, Fred Konstand, founded and incorporated 
several entities, including defendant Bivens Center, Inc. (BCI), to develop forty acres into a hotel and 
office park in Gainesville, Florida. Id. at 902. Konstand was the majority shareholder of BCI, and 
James Karns was the largest minority shareholder. Id. Konstand created Bivens Gardens Hotel, Ltd. 
(BGH), a limited partnership with BCI as a fifty percent owner and general partner. Id. Konstand 
funded both BCI and BGH through outside lenders, including University City Bank (UCB). Id. In 
October of 1974, UCB sent notice that a $200,000 loan was in default. Id. at 902–03. UCB officers and 
lawyers then went to the home of Karns, obtained a false proxy, and held a shareholder meeting in 
which it forced Konstand out of office. Id. at 903. UCB then appointed a twenty-four-year-old as 
president, who subsequently ran the company into bankruptcy. Id. During bankruptcy, the defendant 
fraudulently sold the hotel for $1.5 million under market value. Id. 
 147. Id. at 908. 
 148. Id. (“As a creditor, Konstand had a direct interest in seeing the hotel sold for as high a price 
as possible. . . . [T]he sale of the hotel at a lower price affected creditors . . . in a manner sufficiently 
direct to confer RICO standing . . . .”). 
 149. 30 F.3d 289 (2d Cir. 1994). 
 150. Id. at 290–91. The plaintiff, GICC Capital Corporation (Capital), settled an unrelated 
litigation with Technology Finance Group, Inc. (TFG) by accepting a promissory note for $500,000. 
Id. at 290. TFG subsequently defaulted because it conspired with its former parent corporation, 
Creative Resources, Inc. (CRI), to strip the corporation of its assets through a series of transactions. Id. 
at 291. First, CRI and TFG reorganized, reassigning a TFG subsidiary, Apple Leasing, to CRI, 
depriving TFG of income. Second, CRI caused Apple to make subsequent repurchase transactions 
instead of TFG. Through Apple, CRI also forced TFG to buy others that it sold to Apple for no profit. 
This scheme resulted in a stream of profits that flowed from Apple directly to CRI, bypassing TFG and 
leaving it as a shell corporation. Third, CRI transferred one million dollars to overseas subsidiaries to 
frustrate collection of TFG’s debts. Fourth, CRI caused the sale of TFG to a new shell company, 
casting TFG adrift and releasing the insolvent subsidiary. Id. 
 151. Id. at 293 (“The question remains one of proximate cause, which we find adequately alleged 
here.”). 
 152. Id. at 293 (“[C]apital allegedly accepted a litigation settlement unaware that defendants had 
conveyed assets, and Capital’s collection was frustrated when defendants stripped TFG of its assets. 
Capital’s claim is squarely within the compass of our past decisions regarding standing.”). 
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2. Proximate Cause and Unfair Competition 
Civil RICO has also been an important tool in the battle against unfair 
competition.153 Although some argue that antitrust laws provide adequate 
protection, “[t]here are several situations in which RICO may be a better 
remedy for a plaintiff.”154 Antitrust jurisprudence is replete with standing 
limitations that limit its applicability, such as the “indirect purchaser” rule 
and “antitrust injury.”155 Furthermore, a plaintiff’s antitrust claim would 
fail against a defendant who acted unilaterally or was incapable of 
monopolizing the market.156 However, a plaintiff can avoid these antitrust 
issues and receive compensation from the predatory competitor under civil 
RICO.157 RICO additionally prevents an unfairly competing racketeer 
from forcing his competitors to make a Hobson’s choice: engage in 
retaliatory racketeering or go out of business.158 
Although many courts had difficulty applying the Holmes directness 
requirement to unfair competition cases, some courts considered the 
racketeer’s intent to avoid curtailing civil RICO’s power to thwart 
anticompetitive behavior. Because of the complexity of the cases, the 
courts focused on not only the directness of the injury, but also on the 
intent of the racketeer.159 The use of the “intent” element comports with 
RICO’s protection of “competitors . . . whose businesses and interests are 
harmed . . . or whose competitive positions decline because of infiltration 
 
 
 153. See Blakey & Perry, supra note 5, at 908 n.153 (“Retailers that have to compete with tax 
cheating competitors are put at a substantial and often disabling competitive disadvantage. This 
problem also implicates RICO’s core concerns. Unfair competition, rooted in the profits of illegal 
behavior, goes to RICO’s basic rationale.”). 
 154. Miller & Olson, supra note 7, at 16.  
 155. “Customers that do not compete or deal directly with a defendant (termed ‘indirect 
purchasers’) generally lack standing to sue it for damages under Clayton Act Section 4.” WILLIAM C. 
HOLMES, ANTITRUST LAW HANDBOOK § 9:10 (2007). “Antitrust injury” is “injury of the type the 
antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that which makes defendants’ acts 
unlawful.” Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977). 
 156. Miller & Olson, supra note 7, at 16. 
 157. Id. at 16–17.  
 158. Blakey & Perry, supra note 5, at 908 n.153 (“‘When a gas station on one corner decides to 
cheat,’ New York Attorney General Robert Abrams rightly observes, ‘the gas stations on the other 
three corners have to cheat or lose money and in some cases go out of business.’” (quoting Cook, 
Making Crime Pay, FORBES, July 27, 1987, at 57)). 
 159. See Mid Atlantic Telecom, Inc. v. Long Distance Servs., Inc., 18 F.3d 260, 263 (4th Cir. 
1994) (“[I]t was recognized that ‘the legal cause determination is properly one of law for the court, 
taking into consideration such factors as the foreseeability of the particular injury, the intervention of 
other independent causes, and the factual directness of the causal connection.’ . . . We did not, 
however, intend to establish a rule that only injuries suffered by the immediate victim of the predicate 
act satisfied the ‘by reason of’ requirement of § 1964(c).”) (citing Brandenburg v. Seidel, 859 F.2d 
1179, 1187, 1189 (4th Cir. 1988)). 
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in the relevant market.”160 Lower courts recognized that “the reasonably 
foreseeable victims of a RICO violation are the targets, competitors and 
intended victims of the racketeering enterprise.”161 Although the plaintiff 
still had to allege proximate cause,162 courts found that when a racketeer 
intended to injure a competitor, he violated civil RICO.163  
For example, in Commercial Cleaning Services, L.L.C. v. Colin Service 
Systems, Inc.,164 the Second Circuit applied the Holmes directness test.165 
In Commercial Cleaning, the plaintiff alleged that its competitor, Colin 
Service Systems (Colin), engaged in an illegal hiring scheme in which it 
hired illegal immigrants at low wages.166 The plaintiff further alleged that 
this hiring scheme gave Colin a “significant business advantage over other 
firms” in the cleaning services industry.167 The Second Circuit analyzed 
the plaintiff’s claim using the three policy rationales set forth in 
Holmes.168 First, the difficulty of determining damages was not an issue 
because the plaintiff directly bid against Colin; therefore, the court could 
accurately measure the plaintiff’s losses.169 Colin argued that the plaintiff 
“complain[ed] of an injury caused by the low wages paid to Colin’s 
workers—and not by their immigration status.”170 The court responded by 
focusing on Colin’s intent: “the purpose of the alleged violation . . . was 
. . . to employ a cheaper labor force and compete unfairly on the basis of 
lower costs.”171 Second, the difficulty of apportioning damages was 
inconsequential because the plaintiff was the only victim and was not 
alleging a derivative injury.172 Finally, the court noted that there was no 
 
 
 160. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 519 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also 
id. at 497 n.15 (majority opinion) (agreeing with the dissent’s statement regarding competitive injury). 
 161. Lerner v. Fleet Bank, N.A., 318 F.3d 113, 124 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that claims against the 
bank by depositors who were defrauded by a third party were too attenuated) (emphasis added). 
 162. Commercial Cleaning Servs., L.L.C. v. Colin Serv. Sys., Inc., 271 F.3d 374, 380 (2d Cir. 
2001) (holding that the damages must satisfy “ideas of what justice demands or of what is 
administratively possible and convenient” (quoting Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 
268 (1992))). 
 163. See Terminate Control Corp. v. Horowitz, 28 F.3d 1335, 1344–46 (2d Cir. 1994); Mid 
Atlantic, 18 F.3d at 262–64; Cf. Abrahams v. Young & Rubicam, Inc., 79 F.3d 234, 238–39 (2d Cir. 
1996); Lewis v. Robinson (In re American Express Co. S’holder Litig.), 39 F.3d 395, 399–401 (2d Cir. 
1994). 
 164. 271 F.3d 374 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 165. Id. at 380–85. 
 166. Id. at 378–79. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. at 381–82. 
 169. Id. at 382–83. 
 170. Id. at 383. 
 171. Id.  
 172. Id. at 383–84. 
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other more direct victim to vindicate the aims of the statute.173 Under the 
analysis of Commercial Cleaning, a competitor who was intentionally 
targeted by the racketeer suffered a direct, non-derivative injury that was 
easily calculable and satisfied the Holmes directness requirement. 
In Mid Atlantic Telecom, Inc. v. Long Distance Services, Inc.,174 the 
Fourth Circuit held that a plaintiff could satisfy the Holmes directness 
requirement by establishing that his injury was proximately caused by a 
defendant’s mail fraud, despite the fact that only a third party had relied on 
the fraud.175 In Mid Atlantic, the defendant-competitor defrauded the 
plaintiff’s customers by mailing solicitations containing false long-
distance rates, and then fraudulently inflated the length of calls billed.176 
The court rejected the defendant’s argument that the plaintiff’s injury was 
derivative of the customer’s injury. Instead, the court found that Mid 
Atlantic had claimed “distinct and independent injuries,” including lost 
customers and lost revenue due to the need to match the artificially 
lowered rates.177 The court held that this satisfied the Holmes directness 
requirement.178 
In re American Honda Motor Co. Dealerships Relations Litigation179 
tested the outer limits of the Holmes directness requirement. The American 
Honda court held that the plaintiffs satisfied the Holmes requirement when 
they alleged that other car dealers had bribed Honda executives to get 
extra inventory, causing the plaintiffs to lose profits.180 The court found 
 
 
 173. Id. at 384–85. 
 174. 18 F.3d 260 (4th Cir. 1994). 
 175. Id. at 263–64. 
 176. Id. at 261. Mid Atlantic Telecom, Inc. (Mid Atlantic) claimed that Long Distance Services, 
Inc. (LDS) subsequently maintained these low rates by artificially inflating the lengths of calls of its 
customers, defrauding them of pennies per call. Id. at 261. The court noted that “[i]n practical effect, 
however, the quoted rates were not lower, since additional minutes were randomly and artificially 
added to the lengths of telephone calls.” Id.  
 177. Id. at 263–64 (finding the plaintiff was not trying to “vindicate the rights of its former 
customers who may have been offered fraudulently low rates”). LDS and its codefendants argued that 
the customers were the only victims of any alleged fraud that occurred. They argued that any injury 
suffered by Mid Atlantic was, at most, a derivative injury stemming from the injury to the defrauded 
customers. LDS additionally contended that any injury suffered by Mid Atlantic stemmed from its 
independent, intervening acts, not from LDS’s solicitations. The court was “unable to agree.” Id. at 
263. 
 178. Id. 
 179. 941 F. Supp. 528 (D. Md. 1996). 
 180. Id. at 534. The plaintiff dealers alleged that other dealers in the Honda syndicate bribed 
Honda executives to allocate to them larger allotments of automobiles, thereby depriving the plaintiffs 
of the opportunity to sell those cars. Plaintiffs additionally alleged that “Honda pressured dealers to 
participate in sales training seminars offered by a vendor that paid kickbacks to Honda executives.” Id. 
at 535. Honda also allegedly “pressured dealers to participate in group advertising activities provided 
by an advertising firm that paid kickbacks to Honda executives.” Id. Furthermore, Honda allegedly 
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the plaintiff-dealers had alleged an “obvious causal connection between 
their lost profits and the predicate acts constituting the bribery scheme.”181 
This scheme to bribe a distributor, in a limited supply market, directly and 
proximately injured the plaintiff.182 The court stated that the Holmes 
directness requirement was satisfied despite the complexity of quantifying 
the individual dealer’s loss.183 
These courts recognized that plaintiffs who were direct targets of a 
RICO violation should be able to recover for direct and foreseeable 
injuries.184 In these cases, the courts understood that more than one victim 
could be a foreseeable and intended victim.185 Courts extended civil 
RICO’s protection to these exceptional cases to satisfy fundamental 
conceptions of fairness and congressional intent.186 However, in 2006, the 
Supreme Court altered this balance by abruptly redefining proximate cause 
in Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp.187 
E. Anza 
The Supreme Court altered civil RICO’s proximate cause requirement 
in Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp.188 The plaintiff, Ideal Steel 
Corporation (Ideal), sold metal products in the Bronx and Queens,189 while 
National Steel Supply (National) operated similar stores in Queens.190 
Beginning in 1998, National sought to increase its market share and 
 
 
“awarded ‘Letters of Intent’ for new dealerships on the basis of bribes and kickbacks.” Id. 
Furthermore, the plaintiffs alleged that Honda executives, “prompted by attorneys at Lyon & Lyon, 
committed perjury, tampered with witnesses and otherwise obstructed criminal investigations of 
Honda that took place in the early 1990’s.” Id. Finally, Honda allegedly “falsified tax records to cover 
up the bribery activities of executives.” Id.  
 181. Id. at 545. (“That plaintiff dealers would be deprived of profits is the direct and foreseeable 
result of the alleged scheme to give and receive bribes in exchange for higher allocations of cars.”). 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. at 538. 
 184. Commercial Cleaning Servs. LLC v. Colin Serv. Sys., Inc., 271 F.3d 374, 381–82 (2d Cir. 
2001). 
 185. Id. at 385. 
 186. See id. at 384–95. 
 187. 126 S. Ct. 1991 (2006). 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. at 1994. Ideal operated one store in Queens and one store in the Bronx. Id. It sold steel 
mill products and related supplies and services to professional ironworkers, small steel fabricators, and 
do-it-yourself homeowners. Ideal Steel Supply Corp v. Anza, 373 F.3d 251, 254 (2d Cir. 2004), rev’d, 
126 S. Ct. 1991 (2006). It sold to customers in New Jersey, New York, and Connecticut. Id. 
 190. Anza, 373 F.3d at 254. National sold substantially the same products as Ideal, and its stores 
were located minutes from Ideal’s stores. The Anza brothers were the owners and operators of 
National. Id. For the sake of clarity, all reference to the party accused of racketeering will be to 
“National.” 
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revenue by lowering prices through tax and mail fraud.191 The company 
did not charge cash-paying customers sales tax and did not report these 
sales to the State of New York.192 This practice artificially lowered prices, 
increased National’s market share, and caused Ideal to lose business.193 
These intentional, predicate acts served National’s goal of expanding its 
market into the Bronx to compete with Ideal.194 
The Second Circuit vacated the district court’s dismissal of Ideal’s 
claims and found that Ideal had standing to bring the civil RICO action.195 
The court applied the Holmes directness requirement and held that “a 
RICO claim based on mail fraud may be proven where the 
misrepresentations were relied on by a third person, rather than by the 
plaintiff.”196 The court reached this holding by first looking at Second 
Circuit precedent that recognized that “the reasonably foreseeable victims 
of a RICO violation are the targets, competitors and intended victims of 
the racketeering enterprise.”197 The court then applied this precedent and 
found that Ideal satisfied the directness requirement because it had alleged 
direct harm “by means of a fraud perpetrated on another person.”198 The 
court also considered the intent of National’s tax evasion scheme, which 
was to unfairly compete with Ideal.199 The court recognized that the 
natural target of the scheme was Ideal; therefore, Ideal’s allegations 
satisfied the directness requirement.200 Accordingly, the Second Circuit 
 
 
 191. Id. at 254–55. 
 192. Id.  
 193. Id. at 255. 
 194. Id.  
 195. Id. at 264–65. 
 196. Id. at 262; accord County of Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting Co., 907 F.2d 1295, 1311 (2d 
Cir. 1990) (noting that civil RICO merely requires a causal connection between the prohibited conduct 
and the injury alleged, not that the prohibited conduct be directed at the injured party); see also Shaw 
v. Rolex Watch U.S.A., Inc., 726 F. Supp. 969, 973 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (“A plaintiff who is injured as a 
proximate result of fraud should be able to recover regardless of whether he or a third party is the one 
deceived.”). 
 197. Anza, 373 F.3d at 260 (quoting Lerner v. Fleet Bank, N.A., 318 F.3d 113, 124 (2d Cir. 
2003)). 
 198. Id. at 263. 
 199.  
[T]he defendant engaged in a pattern of fraudulent conduct that is within the RICO definition 
of racketeering activity and that was intended to and did give the defendant a competitive 
advantage over the plaintiff, the complaint adequately pleads proximate cause, and the 
plaintiff has standing to pursue a civil RICO claim. This is so even where the scheme 
depended on fraudulent communications directed to and relied on by a third party rather 
than the plaintiff. 
Id. (emphasis added)). 
 200. Id. at 264 (“The principal intended victim of the scheme was Ideal, over which defendants 
sought to secure a competitive advantage by giving certain cash customers an unlawful benefit, and by 
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reasoned that Ideal Steel could bring RICO claims under § 1962(c) 
(operating an enterprise through racketeering activity) and § 1962(a) 
(investment of RICO funds).201 
The Supreme Court disagreed.202 The Court stringently interpreted the 
Holmes proximate cause requirement by introducing a new theory of 
“directness,”203 distinct from that adopted in Holmes.204 The Court 
redefined “direct” to limit recovery to only immediate victims of the 
predicate act, thereby excluding non-immediate victims.205 Using this 
theory, the Court determined that the State of New York was the 
immediate victim of the racketeering because it had lost tax revenue.206 
The Court reclassified Ideal as an indirect victim of the racketeering 
activity, reasoning that the injury Ideal suffered was derivative of the State 
of New York’s tax fraud injury.207  
The Court used the three reasons first articulated in Holmes to justify 
this reclassification: difficulty of determining damages, duplicative 
recovery, and the ability of more direct victims to vindicate RICO’s 
purpose.208 The Court was concerned that Ideal’s injury was too remote to 
determine the actual cause of the injury.209 Echoing fears first raised in 
 
 
concealing that unlawful conduct and retaining the resulting profits by means of racketeering 
activity.”). 
 201. Id.  
 202. Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 126 S. Ct. 1991, 1999 (2006). 
 203. Id. at 1996–97. The Court circuitously interpreted the actual cause of Ideal’s injuries in its 
analysis. The Court started with the racketeering activity, which is undisputedly National’s defrauding 
New York of its taxes. The Court then asserted that the only direct injury was New York’s loss of 
revenue, claiming that Ideal’s injuries were merely derivative of this fraud. What the Court failed to 
consider was the totality of the scheme. National intended to gain a competitive edge by not charging 
the tax, thereby lowering the price through its racketeering. The total racketeering scheme involved 
multiple steps, not merely the predicate act. This rationale, however, failed to persuade the majority. 
See id. at 1998. 
 204. See id. at 1997. 
 205. See id. 
 206. Id. (“The direct victim of this conduct was the State of New York, not Ideal. . . . The proper 
referent of the proximate-cause analysis is an alleged practice of conducting National’s business 
through a pattern of defrauding the State.”). 
 207. Id. at 1997–98. 
 208. Id.  
 209. Id. at 1997 (“Ideal’s lost sales could have resulted from factors other than petitioners’ alleged 
acts of fraud. Businesses lose and gain customers for many reasons, and it would require a complex 
assessment to establish what portion of Ideal’s lost sales were the product of National’s decreased 
prices.”). The Court further reasoned that National’s price lowering might not have been attributable to 
the tax scheme. 
National, however, could have lowered its prices for any number of reasons unconnected to 
the asserted pattern of fraud. It may have received a cash inflow from some other source or 
concluded that the additional sales would justify a smaller profit margin. Its lowering of 
prices in no sense required it to defraud the state tax authority. Likewise, the fact that a 
company commits tax fraud does not mean the company will lower its prices. . . . 
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Holmes, the Court worried that factors such as possible poor management 
of Ideal, market complexities, and customer preferences made calculating 
the damages attributable to National’s racketeering too difficult and 
speculative.210 The Court further felt that the direct causal connection 
requirement prevented duplicative recoveries; otherwise, the racketeer 
might have to pay multiple times for his one RICO offense.211 Finally, the 
Court believed the direct victim, the State of New York, would vindicate 
its rights, thereby fulfilling RICO’s enforcement purpose.212 Under the 
majority view, these factors required restricting recovery to only those 
plaintiffs who were the direct and immediate victims of RICO schemes.213 
Justice Thomas, in his dissent, criticized the majority’s opinion, finding 
it inconsistent with the holding of Holmes and the general purpose of civil 
RICO.214 Holmes, Thomas argued, stood for the proposition that “a 
plaintiff who complained of harm flowing merely from the misfortunes 
visited upon a third person by the defendant’s acts was generally said to 
stand at too remote a distance to recover.”215 Thomas agreed that the 
plaintiff in Holmes was an indirect victim, a public corporation that 
advanced money to cover the injuries caused by broker-dealer 
malfeasance.216 However, Ideal did not claim that New York’s injury 
caused the injury to Ideal, but rather alleged that the conduct of National 
directly caused Ideal’s injury.217 Under the Holmes analysis, this allegation 
would have satisfied the directness requirement because it alleged a direct, 
non-derivative injury.218 Thomas argued that the majority’s focus on the 
 
 
Id. at 1997. 
 210. Id. (“One motivating principle is the difficulty that can arise when a court attempts to 
ascertain the damages caused by some remote action.”). The Court feared that much of the injury 
could be attributable to market forces, business practices, and the tastes of the public. Id. Contra id. at 
2001 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“We did not adopt the . . . proposition that any injuries that are difficult 
to ascertain must be classified as indirect . . . .”).  
 Furthermore, the Court insisted that failing to pay taxes did not always lower prices, id. at 1997, 
but this point seems irrelevant because National did lower prices by not charging taxes. See id. at 2002 
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting this was not a price lowering scheme but rather that “[National] 
simply ceased charging tax on cash sales, allegedly, and logically, because it had ceased reporting 
those sales”). 
 211. Id. at 1997–98 (majority opinion). 
 212. Id. at 1998. 
 213. Id. at 1997–98 (“When a court evaluates a RICO claim for proximate causation, the central 
question it must ask is whether the alleged violation led directly to the plaintiff’s injuries. In the instant 
case, the answer is no.”). 
 214. Id. at 1999–2008 (2006) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 215. Id. at 2000 (quoting Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268–69 (1992)). 
 216. Id.  
 217. Id. at 2001. 
 218. Id.; see Holmes, 503 U.S. at 271–74. 
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predicate act failed to consider the purpose of National’s scheme: to 
unfairly compete with Ideal.219 According to Thomas, the predicate acts 
alone did not violate RICO, but rather the violation stemmed from 
National’s conducting of its business through a pattern of racketeering 
activity.220  
Furthermore, Thomas noted, the majority’s opinion allowed racketeers 
to intentionally target their competitors.221 For example, consider a 
hypothetical in which A and B are competitors in a business. A 
specifically wants to injure B by committing a pattern of RICO predicate 
acts. However, A has the foresight and planning to commit the predicate 
acts upon C, causing B injury. The Anza majority would deny B recovery. 
If A was particularly sophisticated, he could concoct a scheme that caused 
no legally cognizable injury to C, thereby avoiding civil liability 
altogether. This result clearly would undermine the dual purposes of the 
civil RICO statute.222 
III. ANALYSIS 
In Holmes, the Court appropriately limited recovery to those who 
suffered direct injury from the racketeering activity.223 Holmes used the 
term “directness” to differentiate between direct and derivative injuries.224 
 
 
 219. Anza, 126 S. Ct. at 2001 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 220. Id. 
 221.  
The Court, in contrast, permits a defendant to evade liability for harms that are not only 
foreseeable, but the intended consequences of the defendant’s unlawful behavior. A defendant 
may do so simply by concocting a scheme under which a further, lawful and intentional step 
by the defendant is required to inflict the injury. Such a rule precludes recovery for injuries 
for which the defendant is plainly morally responsible and which are suffered by easily 
identifiable plaintiffs. 
Id. at 2004. 
 222. Id. at 2006 (“It is not difficult to imagine a competitive injury to a business that would result 
from the kind of organized crime that Sedima, Congress, and the Commission all recognized as the 
principal concern of RICO, yet that would fail the Court’s restrictive proximate-cause test.” (citation 
omitted)). 
 223. Holmes, 503 U.S. at 265–700. Keeton also notes the underlying justification for this common 
law limitation:  
In a philosophical sense, the consequences of an act go forward to eternity, and the causes of 
an event go back to the dawn of human events, and beyond. But any attempt to impose 
responsibility upon such a basis would result in infinite liability for all wrongful acts, and 
would “set society on edge and fill the courts with endless litigation.”  
KEETON, DOBBS, KEETON & OWEN, supra note 124, § 41, at 264 (citation omitted) (quoting North v. 
Johnson, 59 N.W. 1012 (Minn. 1894)). 
 224. Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268 (“Accordingly, among the many shapes this concept took at 
common law . . . was a demand for some direct relation between the injury asserted and the injurious 
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The Anza Court, however, re-characterized “directness” by adding a 
requirement that a direct victim also be the immediate victim of the 
predicate act.225 This redefinition significantly narrows the application of 
civil RICO and could have serious ramifications for both creditor-victims 
of corporate looting and for competitors alleging unfair competition 
because it ignores the intent of the racketeering scheme. 
The root of this interpretation is the Anza Court’s focus on three 
underlying principles: the difficulty of determining damages, duplicative 
recovery, and the ability of more direct victims to vindicate RICO’s 
purpose.226 The concern about the difficulty of damage determination was 
twofold. First, the majority worried that the connection between the tax 
fraud and Ideal’s injury was too speculative to warrant recovery.227 The 
Court was concerned that factors other than the tax fraud might have 
caused the lower prices; therefore, National could be punished with 
damages for an injury caused by legal price lowering that was independent 
of the alleged scheme.228 Second, the Court feared that the lower prices, 
legal or not, might not have been the actual cause of Ideal’s injuries, in 
which case National might incur liability for damages relating to an injury 
it did not cause.229  
Although the difficultly in damage calculation is a valid prudential 
concern, it ignores a key fact of the case. National intended to injure Ideal 
by stealing customers through its tax evasion scheme.230 National did not 
gain any direct monetary advantage by failing to charge sales tax; if it had 
collected taxes, it would have had to remit those funds to the state.231 
Instead, the only benefit National got for violating the law was a 
competitive advantage.232 Therefore, it seems counterintuitive to speculate 




 225. Anza, 126 S. Ct. at 1997–1998 (“[The requirement of a] direct causal connection is especially 
warranted where the immediate victims of an alleged RICO violation can be expected to vindicate the 
laws by pursuing their own claims.”). 
 226. Id. at 1997–98. 
 227. Id. at 1997 (“[C]onsidering the directness requirement’s underlying premises[,] . . . [o]ne 
motivating principle is the difficulty that can arise when a court attempts to ascertain the damages 
caused by some remote action.”). 
 228. Id. at 1997 (discussing how National may have lowered the price independently of the tax 
fraud, either through a conscious business decision or due to a windfall in cash). 
 229. Id. at 1997 (discussing how Ideal’s injuries may have been caused by a variety of factors, 
including fair competition, decreased customer service, and other market forces that would make 
calculating the losses directly attributable to National’s lower prices difficult, if not impossible). 
 230. See id. at 1995. 
 231. See N.Y. TAX LAW § 1105 (McKinney 2004). 
 232. Anza, 126 S. Ct. at 1995. 
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its actions to cause certain damages to a certain party and those exact 
damages later occurred. 
Duplicative recovery refers to the Court’s fear that multiple recoveries 
could punish the defendant multiple times for the same crime.233 Limiting 
the recovery to the immediate victim eliminated these fears by allowing 
only one person to pursue the defendant and fulfill RICO’s enforcement 
purpose.234 However, like the “difficulty in determining damages” 
concern, this rationale similarly fails to consider that the defendant 
intended to injure these targeted parties and should be held accountable for 
his intentional actions.235 
A broad reading of Anza’s final principle—that a more direct victim 
could vindicate the purpose of the RICO statute—threatens to undermine 
the civil RICO statute. Although the “more direct victim” concept seems 
to be grounded in prudential concerns, it could potentially eliminate 
standing for all private parties.236 The RICO statute requires proof of a 
predicate act arising from state or federal criminal statutes; therefore, the 
government will always be in a better position to vindicate the statute’s 
aims than a private individual.237 Accordingly, under Anza’s rationale a 
private plaintiff would never be the most immediate victim, and therefore 
would not have RICO standing.238 This result conflicts with one of the 
reasons behind the enactment of civil RICO: the inadequacies of 
government enforcement.239 
Furthermore, Anza’s “more direct victim” factor may result in a 
heightened burden on lower courts and could lead to potentially absurd 
results.240 Courts must now consider not only the prima facie elements, but 
also whether other potentially damaged parties exist.241 Consideration of 
this factor could lead to complicated judicial inquiry into myriad aspects 
of the competitive market, including business trends, customer’s interests, 
 
 
 233. Id. at 1997–98. 
 234. See discussion of the enforcement purpose supra Part II.B. 
 235. See Commercial Cleaning Servs., L.L.C. v. Colin Serv. Sys., Inc., 271 F.3d 374, 384 (2d Cir. 
2001). 
 236. See id. at 385. 
 237. Id. 
 238.  
If the existence of a public authority that could prosecute a claim against putative RICO 
defendants meant that the plaintiff is too remote under Holmes, then no private cause of 
action could ever be maintained, for every RICO predicate offense, as well as the RICO 
enterprise itself, is separately prosecutable by the government. 
See id. 
 239. See Feldman, supra note 76, at 120. 
 240. See Anza, 126 S. Ct. 1997–98. 
 241. See id. 
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and state’s interests—the very type of inquiry the Anza court was trying to 
avoid.242 Additionally, the “more direct victim” factor may inadvertently 
eliminate RICO’s protection of the very victims of racketeering the statute 
intended to protect: those who suffered injury because the defendant 
conducted an enterprise “through a pattern of racketeering activity.”243 If 
read broadly, Anza’s “more direct victim” factor may allow a RICO 
defendant to escape liability by committing the racketeering against a third 
party in a way that caused injury to the competitor-victim. If the third 
party is uninjured by the racketeering, there would not be an immediate 
victim to vindicate RICO’s purpose.244 Apparently, the defendant would 
be free to engage in this impermissible conduct without fear of reprisals.  
Because Anza addressed these three concerns without considering the 
racketeer’s intent, it may foreclose civil RICO’s protection in cases of 
corporate looting.245 In the typical RICO corporate looting case the 
defendant-looters convert the assets of the corporation, causing its 
imminent bankruptcy.246 This bankruptcy leaves the creditors without 
 
 
 242. See id. at 1997. 
 243. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(c), 1964(c) (2000); see also Organized Crime Control Hearings, supra 
note 1, at 106 (statement of Sen. John McClellan) (mentioning in his testimony before the Committee 
on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives, this exact scenario—a party misreporting taxes to 
gain a competitive advantage over legitimate businesses—and calling it one of the “most offensive 
aspect[s] of [racketeers’] infiltration”). McClellan noted that one of the corrupt and violent ways in 
which organized crime has acquired and operated businesses is by understating income for tax 
purposes “so that mob businesses have competitive advantages over businesses which report all their 
income.” Id.  
 244. See Anza, 126 S. Ct. at 1997–98. For a case rejecting this approach and applying a more 
limited interpretation of Anza, see Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co. v. Bridge, 477 F.3d 928, 931 (7th Cir. 
2007). In Bridge, the defendant committed mail fraud when it lied to Cook County about its 
compliance with a single-bid-per-parcel rule during a tax-lien auction. 477 F.3d at 929–30. The 
plaintiff complained that the lower bids caused him to acquire fewer tax liens, hurting his business. 
The court rejected the defendant’s contention that the sole victim was the County, noting, “[t]he only 
injured parties are the losing bidders, who acquire fewer tax liens than they would if the [s]ingle, 
[s]imultaneous [b]idder [r]ule were followed.” Id. at 931. 
 245.  
As a result, after today, civil RICO plaintiffs that suffer precisely the kind of injury that 
motivated the adoption of the civil RICO provision will be unable to obtain relief. If this 
result was compelled by the text of the statute, the interference with congressional intent 
would be unavoidable. Given that the language is not even fairly susceptible of such a 
reading, however, I cannot agree with this frustration of congressional intent.  
Anza, 126 S. Ct. at 2006 (Thomas, J., dissenting). See also Organized Crime Control Hearings, supra 
note 1, at 520 (statement of Rep. Sam Steiger). 
 246. For examples of these so-called “bust-out” schemes, in which the corporate looter steals the 
assets of the corporation and leaves nothing for the creditors, see ePlus Tech., Inc. v. Aboud, 313 F.3d 
166, 170–75, 182–83 (4th Cir. 2002) (holding defendant liable for RICO violations when the 
defendant set up several credit scams to defraud computer-equipment suppliers) and Isaak v. Trumbull 
Sav. & Loan Co., 169 F.3d 390, 397–98, 401 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding defendant committed RICO 
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recompense because the looters have removed all of the company’s equity. 
Earlier courts recognized that creditor-victims who were targets of 
corporate looting and suffered direct, non-derivative injury from the 
racketeering satisfied civil RICO’s proximate cause requirement.247 
However, Anza indicates that these creditor-victims would lack standing to 
bring a civil RICO action,248 even if they suffered injuries due to the 
intentional, targeted actions of the looters.249 Anza could potentially deny 
these creditors civil RICO protection because the corporation is the 
immediate victim and could vindicate its own rights, much like the 
government in Anza.250 This application would undermine the dual 
remedial purposes of the civil RICO provision by denying compensation 
to these intended victims and reducing the number of victims able to 
combat racketeering.251  
In cases of unfair competition, Anza may have a similar negative 
impact. Congress intended civil RICO to provide an avenue for 
compensating the victims of organized crime and racketeering.252 Prior to 
Anza, the courts recognized that intentional targets of unfair competition 
deserved compensation, even if they were not the most immediate victim, 
because they were direct victims.253 For example, the court in Commercial 
Cleaning focused on the substance, rather than the form, of the 
 
 
violations in complicated scheme involving fake real estate development, but dismissing because of 
statute of limitations). 
 247. See GICC Capital Corp. v. Tech. Fin. Group, Inc., 30 F.3d 289, 293 (2d Cir. 1994) (creditors 
have RICO standing when corporate assets disappear as a result of fraud). Cf. Manson v. Stacescu, 11 
F.3d 1127, 1130 (2d Cir. 1993) (creditor’s injury is derivative of corporation’s; proximate cause is 
lacking, and creditor does not have RICO standing). 
 248. See Anza, 126 S. Ct. at 1997–98 (discussing the directness requirement of the proximate 
cause analysis). 
 249. See id.; cf. GICC Capital, 30 F.3d at 292–93. 
 250. See Anza, 126 S. Ct. at 1997 (“The direct victim of this conduct was the State of New York, 
not Ideal. It was the State that was being defrauded and the State that lost tax revenue as a result.”). 
 251. See Anza, 126 S. Ct. at 2004 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 252.  
The first bill . . . would enable the antitrust law enforcement agencies to act promptly to 
discover the source of funds by means of discovery techniques, and add the sanction of 
private treble damage suits. Thus, organized criminal activity in legitimate businesses could 
be attacked before its anticompetitive effect had an opportunity to destroy the business.  
113 CONG. REC. 17,999 (1967) (statement of Sen. Roman Hruska) (discussing a bill that was a 
precursor to the civil RICO provision). 
 253. See, e.g., Bankers Trust Company v. Rhoades, 859 F.2d 1096, 1101 (2d Cir. 1988) (finding 
the creditor suffered a cognizable injury under civil RICO when corporate looters committed 
bankruptcy fraud); see also GICC Capital, 30 F.3d at 292 (finding the creditor satisfied proximate 
cause when the debtor issued a false promissory note and then immediately filed for bankruptcy); Mid 
Atlantic Telecom, Inc. v. Long Distance Servs., Inc., 18 F.3d 260, 262–64 (4th Cir. 1994) (finding the 
plaintiff satisfied proximate cause requirements by alleging that a competitor caused it direct injury by 
defrauding the plaintiff’s customers). 
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violation.254 And, in Mid Atlantic the Fourth Circuit stated that a plaintiff, 
who was the targeted victim of a RICO violation, should be able to 
recover from an injury caused by a third party’s reliance on the 
racketeering.255  
However, the Anza majority’s disregard of the racketeer’s intent now 
seems to be foreclosing civil RICO’s use in unfair competition cases.256 
For example, a recent Seventh Circuit case determined that a construction 
company lacked standing to bring a civil RICO action when it alleged that 
former employees and a competitor conspired to rig bids for state 
construction contracts.257 The court reasoned that the state might have 
awarded the defendants the bids absent the racketeering activities;258 
therefore, the plaintiffs failed to prove that the racketeering was the 
proximate cause of the lost contract opportunity even though they were the 
direct, targeted victims of the scheme.259 This type of case indicates that 
Anza may signal the end of the use of civil RICO in the unfair competition 
forum because courts may find the competitive injury too difficult to 
attribute to the predicate act.260 The mere fact that a racketeer is intelligent 
enough, or lucky enough, to commit the predicate crime against a third 
party should not give him greater flexibility to intentionally target and 
victimize a competitor. 
 
 
 254. See Commercial Cleaning Servs., L.L.C. v. Colin Serv. Sys., Inc., 271 F.3d 374, 383 (2d Cir. 
2001). 
 255. Mid Atlantic, 18 F.3d at 263–64. 
 256. See Anza, 126 S. Ct. 1997–98; infra notes 257–60 and accompanying text. 
 257. James Cape & Sons v. PCC Constr. Co., 453 F.3d 396, 398–99, 401–03 (7th Cir. 2006). The 
plaintiff, James Cape & Sons, was a competitor of the defendants for certain Wisconsin Department of 
Transportation (WisDOT) contracts. Id. at 398. During the bidding process, bidders had to submit 
sworn statements certifying that they “did not collude with competitors or otherwise restrain free 
bidding.” Id.  
Beginning in approximately 1997 and continuing until 2004, the defendants began to unfairly 
rig the WisDOT bidding process. The owners of [the defendants] would meet to discuss 
projects that would soon be up for bid. They would share their companies’ bid information, 
discuss potential competitors, and set bids amongst themselves in an attempt to allocate 
projects between them.  
Id. at 398. The defendants approached an employee of James Cape & Sons, who agreed to reveal the 
plaintiff’s bids to the defendants before the plaintiff entered its bids to WisDOT. Id. This allowed the 
defendants to underbid James Cape on all contracts. Id. 
 258. Id. at 403 (“A court could never be certain whether Cape would have won any of the 
contracts that were the subject of the conspiracy ‘for any number of reasons unconnected to the 
asserted pattern of fraud.’” (quoting Anza, 126 S. Ct. at 1997)). 
 259. Id. (“It is entirely possible that Defendants would have won some bids absent the bid-rigging 
scheme, even if making less profits in the meantime.”). 
 260. See id. (“The [Anza] Court explained that civil RICO plaintiffs must show that the alleged 
fraud directly harmed them, lest damages become too difficult to ascertain.”) (discussing Anza, 126 S. 
Ct. at 1997). 
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In both the corporate looting and unfair competition contexts, targeted 
victims injured by a third party’s reliance on the predicate act may lose 
civil RICO protection.261 Courts should continue to resist attempts to limit 
civil RICO by addressing the concerns of Anza and the purposes of civil 
RICO.262 
IV. PROPOSAL 
Anza presents a multitude of potential impediments to the victims of 
RICO violations. A broad interpretation of Anza threatens to disrupt the 
civil RICO system, depriving compensation to targeted victims of 
racketeering. To avoid these potential pitfalls, courts and Congress should 
take action. 
Courts should guide their proximate cause analysis by employing a 
three-part test that evaluates directness, intent of the racketeer, and Anza’s 
prudential concerns.263 First, courts should employ the Holmes directness 
test to look for “some direct relation between the injury asserted and the 
injurious conduct alleged.”264 In making this determination the court 
should evaluate the foreseeability of the injury and differentiate between 
direct and derivative injuries.265 Focusing on directness makes ascertaining 
damages easier, relieves courts of complicated damage allocations, and 
prevents multiple recoveries.266 Although in most cases this application of 
 
 
 261. See Downstream Envtl., L.L.C. v. Gulf Coast Waste Disposal Auth., No. H-05-1865, 2006 
WL 1875959, at *7 (S.D. Tex. July 5, 2006) (“[T]he cause of Downstream’s asserted injury is that 
[U.S. Oil] charges lower prices, which is distinct from the alleged RICO violations of operating 
without a required permit and improperly dumping waste.”). 
 262. See, e.g., Breslin Realty Dev. Corp. v. Schackner, 457 F. Supp. 2d 132, 137 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).  
 263. Williams v. Mohawk Indus., Inc., 465 F.3d 1277, 1287–89 (11th Cir. 2006) (noting the twin 
aims of Anza and applying them to a case in which plaintiff-employees charged that their employer 
depressed wages through a pattern of racketeering activity which involved employing illegal 
immigrants and holding that the employers had adequately alleged proximate cause). 
 264. Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268 (1992). Keeton also notes the need 
for sensible limitations to common law liability: 
As a practical matter, legal responsibility must be limited to those causes which are so closely 
connected with the result and of such significance that the law is justified in imposing 
liability. Some boundary must be set to liability for the consequences of any act, upon the 
basis of some social idea of justice or policy.  
KEETON, DOBBS, KEETON & OWEN, supra note 124, § 41, at 264. 
 265. Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268–69 (“Thus, a plaintiff who complained of harm flowing merely 
from the misfortunes visited upon a third person by the defendant’s acts was generally said to stand at 
too remote a distance to recover.”); Hamid v. Price Waterhouse, 51 F.3d 1411, 1420 (9th Cir. 1995) 
(distinguishing a creditor’s injury as derivative, rather than direct). 
 266. Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268–74. For a discussion of directness and proximate cause in the field 
of antitrust, see Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters:  
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directness will prevent creditors and competitors from recovering, in 
exceptional circumstances, like those alleged in Anza, courts should abide 
by Congress’s clear intent to compensate victims who suffered injury as a 
direct result of a RICO violation.267 
Second, once the plaintiff has established directness, the court must 
evaluate the intent of the racketeer.268 Addressing intent improves judicial 
accuracy, satisfies the purpose of RICO, and is consistent with the 
approach used by courts before Anza.269 An intent inquiry improves the 
accuracy of the judicial inquiry by allowing the court to consider whether 
the defendant believed his actions would cause the alleged injurious 
conduct. This is valuable because, in many cases, it is likely that the 
defendant will have more experience evaluating the relevant market and a 
better understanding of the impact of its actions. Therefore, the 
defendant’s belief that its racketeering would injure the victim-competitor 
may indicate exactly how the racketeering caused the injury, thereby 
lessening the court’s burden. Additionally, the intent inquiry fulfills 
Congress’s desire to combat organized crime’s infiltration of businesses 
by protecting the intended victims of racketeering.270 Worried that 
organized crime was using its money and power to “infiltrate and corrupt 
 
 
If either these firms [other than the plaintiff], or the immediate victims of coercion by 
defendants, have been injured by an antitrust violation, their injuries would be direct and . . . 
they would have a right to maintain their own treble damages actions against the defendants. 
An action on their behalf would encounter none of the conceptual difficulties that encumber 
the [plaintiff’s] claim. The existence of an identifiable class of persons whose self-interest 
would normally motivate them to vindicate the public interest in antitrust enforcement 
diminishes the justification for allowing a more remote party such as the [plaintiff] to perform 
the office of a private attorney general.  
459 U.S. 519, 541–42 (1983) (footnote call numbers omitted). 
 267.  
In addition to this criminal prohibition, the bill also creates civil remedies for the honest 
businessman who has been damaged by unfair competition from the racketeer businessman. 
Despite the willingness of the courts to apply the Sherman Anti-Trust Act to organized crime 
activities, as a practical matter the legitimate businessman does not have adequate civil 
remedies available under that act. This bill fills that gap.  
115 CONG. REC. 6993 (1969) (statement of Sen. Roman Hruska) (discussing the bill the House 
ultimately patterned the civil RICO provision upon). 
 268. See Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268 (noting that in an antitrust context, directness of relationship is 
not the sole criterion). 
 269. GICC Capital Corp. v. Tech. Fin. Group, Inc., 30 F.3d 289, 293 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that a 
plaintiff has satisfied proximate-cause standing requirements when a corporation issues debt to the 
plaintiff during a scheme to strip the corporation of its assets). 
 270. See Organized Crime Control Hearings, supra note 1, at 106 (statement of Sen. John 
McClellan) (“The corrupt and violent methods by which organized crime members conduct their . . . 
operations are adapted as means of acquiring and operating businesses. . . . These methods and others 
gives such a competitive advantage to the mob enterprise that monopoly power is approached or 
gained, and prices are raised.”). 
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legitimate business,”271 members of the House and Senate voiced concerns 
about the intentional corruption of business through racketeering.272 
Earlier courts recognized that RICO’s remedial nature required extending 
standing to the targeted victims of the racketeering.273 Evaluating the 
intent of the racketeer protects victims in cases involving an injury that is 
intentional and direct. This is the type of behavior Congress intended 
RICO to punish.274 
Finally, courts should consider the difficulty of calculating recovery 
only in extreme cases. Mathematical difficulties should not interfere with 
substantive justice. However, if the damages are uncertain, courts should 
hesitate to impose liability. For example, in unfair competition cases, if the 
plaintiff cannot prove that the racketeer’s actions were a substantial factor 
in causing the injury, then the court should not attempt to allocate damages 
according to proportional guilt. 
When applying these factors, courts should accord different weight to 
each. Courts must start with the threshold inquiry of directness. First, the 
plaintiff must allege that the racketeer caused its injury directly. Courts 
should dismiss any derivative claim in which the plaintiff claims damages 
incurred solely through the visiting of misfortune upon a third party.275 
However, courts must then evaluate the intent of the racketeer, 
determining whether the racketeer was attempting to circumvent the 
directness requirement through his scheme. Accounting for intent in the 
proximate cause analysis negates many of the issues raised by Justice 
Thomas in his Anza dissent.276 Intentional victims of racketeering need 
protection and remuneration, and evaluating the intent of the racketeer 
 
 
 271. H.R. REP. NO. 91-1549, at 1 (1970). 
 272. See Organized Crime Control Hearings, supra note 1, at 106 (statement of Sen. John 
McClellan). 
 273. Bivens Gardens Office Bldg., Inc. v. Barnett Banks of Fla., Inc., 140 F.3d 898, 908 (11th Cir. 
1998) (“[T]he sale of [corporate assets] at a lower price affected creditors in a manner distinct from 
shareholders, and in a manner sufficiently direct to confer RICO standing . . . .”). 
 274. See id.; see also 116 CONG. REC. 35,311 (1970) (statement of Rep. Lawrence H. Fountain) 
(“The time has long since come when the Federal Government should act to adequately protect the 
law-abiding citizens of our country. . . . Organized crime has penetrated almost every type of business 
and industry you can name, imperiling our heritage of responsible competition and legitimate private 
enterprise.”). 
 275. Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268–69. 
 276.   
For example, an organized crime group, running a legitimate business, could, through threats 
of violence, persuade its supplier to sell goods to it at cost, so that it could resell those goods 
at a lower price to drive its competitor out of the business. Honest businessman would be 
unable to compete. . . . Civil RICO, if it was intended to do anything at all, was intended to 
give those businessmen a cause of action.  
Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 126 S. Ct. 1991, 2003 (Thomas, J., dissenting) 
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affords them this protection. Finally, difficulty in calculating damages is 
the least important factor. Dismissal for difficulty in calculating damages 
should not occur unless calculation of the damages is administratively 
unachievable or the plaintiff fails to prove damages. 
In addition to these judicial solutions, Congress should pass legislation 
that clarifies the intent of the civil RICO statute and should extend the 
statute to incorporate white-collar crimes and similar institutional 
malfeasance explicitly. Because of the deterrent effect of the civil RICO 
treble damages provision,277 the statute serves as an important tool to 
combat both traditional and corporate organized crime.278 Additionally, 
competitors and victims are the most vigilant monitors of RICO violations 
because they have both an individual financial incentive and the need to 
maintain a fair market place.279 Expanding civil RICO to expressly include 
more commonly occurring corporate crimes would deter corporate looting 
of companies and unfair competition, increasing the public’s trust in both 
corporate America and confidence in their consumer protection. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court, in an effort to restrict the breadth of the civil 
RICO statute, unintentionally limited claims by plaintiffs who suffer 
precisely the injuries that motivated the enactment of civil RICO. Anza 
inadvisably extends the Holmes proximate cause requirement, which 
required proof that the predicate racketeering act directly and proximately 
caused the plaintiff’s injury. The Court’s aims of addressing issues of 
difficulty in calculating damages, duplicative recoveries, and the presence 
of more immediate victims led to a miscalculation of the ramifications of 
its decision. The Court attempted to institute a narrow definition of 
proximate cause to restrict the proliferation of civil RICO suits. 
Unfortunately, the Court created a loophole in civil RICO jurisprudence, 
providing a safe harbor for perceptive defendants who are able to concoct 
schemes in which they defraud a third party in order to injure the plaintiff. 
This loophole unduly restricts the civil RICO action. 
To remedy the situation, courts need only look for an alternative 
interpretation of Anza. They can address Anza’s concerns of remoteness 
 
 
 277. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2000). 
 278. 1 BRICKEY, supra note 38, § 7:01. 
 279. See Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assoc., 483 U.S. 143, 151 (1987) (“Both [the 
antitrust statutes and RICO] bring to bear the pressure of ‘private attorneys general’ on a serious 
national problem for which public prosecutorial resources are deemed inadequate. . . .”). 
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and duplicative recovery by focusing on three factors when analyzing 
proximate cause: (1) the directness of the injury, (2) the intent of the 
racketeer, and (3) the difficulty of calculating damages. By incorporating 
these factors into their proximate cause calculus, courts can avoid any 
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